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Abstract
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target overvaluation, market liquidity and `hidden earnouts', where tar-
get shareholders participate in the bidder's share of joint synergies, can
explain negative premiums. Empirical tests provide substantial support
for overvaluation and hidden earnouts, but only weak support for market
liquidity. Moreover, we show that the theory for negative premiums gen-
eralizes to positive premiums and predicts lower values for most premiums
below the median.
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1 Introduction
Suppose you own some shares of a company, and a potential acquirer an-
nounces a takeover bid with a negative premium. That is, the bidder proposes
to purchase the shares of this company for less than their market price before
the announcement. Would it be rational to sell your shares? Could it make
sense to buy even more shares? Above all: is this scenario realistic? And if yes,
why would a target give such a bid any serious thought?
Despite the many open questions, this hypothetical scenario has played out
in numerous transactions. In fact, our data shows that negative premiums were
announced in every single year from 1995 to 2011 and that they are economically
signiﬁcant: 8.4% of all mergers and acquisitions (M&As), and up to 14.1% per
year (in 2004) exhibited negative premiums. Besides the evidence presented in
this paper, many earlier studies acknowledged the existence of negative premi-
ums.1 Oﬃcer [2003, p.443], for example, reports that (a)ll premium measures
also result in troubling outliers, with a substantial fraction of each distribu-
tion lying below zero (an economically meaningful bound) and above two (an
arbitrary bound). [Schwert, 1996, p.186, Table 11] ﬁnds at least 6.5% nega-
tive markups and at least 10.1% negative control premiums. When censoring
or truncating negative premiums, he obtains markedly diﬀerent and `disturb-
ing' estimation results. In fact, Schwert [1996, p.187] concludes that (a)ll of
these results are an artefact of truncating or censoring the sample to eliminate
negative runups and markups (or negative runups and premiums).
Yet, no theoretical explanation has been oﬀered for this phenomenon, nor
did it attract any dedicated empirical analysis. Quite to the contrary, negative
premiums are often truncated or omitted in M&A samples, because they are
thought to be noise, or theoretically not explainable.2 For the ﬁrst time, we
propose a theory and test several explanations for negative premiums. More-
over, we show that negative premiums are just the tip of the iceberg of very low
premiums (VLPs), which include negative and non-negative premiums. Actu-
1 See, e.g., Schwert [1996, p.184-187], Oﬃcer [2003, p.443-444], Bates and Lemmon [2003,
p.492], Moeller et al. [2004, p.220], Dong et al. [2006, p.731].
2 Most studies truncate negative premiums at zero (Oﬃcer [2003, p.443], Bates and Lem-
mon [2003, p.492], Moeller et al. [2004, p.220]), or omit cases where the premium is negative
[Schwert, 1996, p.184-187], or use combinations thereof in robustness checks. Dong et al.
[2006, p.731, Footnote 8] and [Oﬃcer, 2007, p.585] omit negative premiums that are smaller
than -50%.
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ally, we ﬁnd that the theory of negative premiums generalizes to the much larger
phenomenon of VLPs and a signiﬁcant proportion of the takeover market, as the
same determinants predict lower values for premiums up to the 40th percentile.
The ﬁrst explanation for negative premiums refers to target overvaluation.
If a target is overvalued, its market value may exceed a fair bid, which con-
stitutes a negative oﬀer premium at the merger announcement. Bidders often
have the opportunity to conduct several rounds of detailed valuations of the tar-
get, including a due diligence, prior to the announcement of their oﬀer Boone
and Mulherin [2007]. Thus, both parties may reach a consensus on the tar-
get's fair value. If the target management anticipates that the overvaluation
will soon become public knowledge, they may accept the disclosure of this over-
valuation with the merger announcement of a negative premium. Everything
else equal, the market should react to this announcement with negative ab-
normal returns to the target, which correct for the overvaluation. The lower,
post-announcement share price then reﬂects the announced bid, consisting of
the target's fair stand-alone value plus a (positive) premium. As an alterna-
tive to fundamental overvaluation, pre-bid runups may constitute speculative
overvaluation of anticipated merger gains to the target. If runups reﬂect the
expectation of a target's share of future synergies, they do not only substitute
the premium, but also leave room for error. Excessive runups may therefore
overshoot the actually announced oﬀer, which leads to a negative premium and
to a corresponding negative market reaction.
The second explanation for negative premiums refers to the fact that bid-
ders pay with ownership when they oﬀer a consideration with stock. Through
this ownership in the merged entity, target shareholders proﬁt twice from merger
synergies: ﬁrst by negotiating a share of synergies for the target that is included
in the oﬀer premium (by means of the share exchange ratio), and second by par-
ticipating in the bidder's share of synergies that accrue to the merged entity (by
means of the target shareholders' ownership in the joint entity). We refer to the
latter as `hidden earnouts' as they are not only hidden in the bidder's negotiated
share, but also conditional upon synergy realization after the consummation of
the merger. Hidden earnouts can be large enough to compensate for negative
premiums. Thus, even though a bidder oﬀers a target less than its market
value, a favorable share exchange ratio may provide target shareholders with
suﬃcient ownership that hidden earnouts make the deal worthwhile. In fact, if
the target is relatively large compared to the bidder, a combination of negative
premiums and hidden earnouts may be the only way for the bidder to pay the
target in stock without risking to lose control over the merged entity. As target
shareholders expect to be compensated for negative oﬀer premiums with even
higher hidden earnouts, the market reaction to such a merger announcement is
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positive.
The third explanation pertains to liquidity in the market for corporate con-
trol and, in extension, liquidity of target's stock. Although ﬁrms prefer to sell
their corporate assets in liquid markets [Schlingemann et al., 2002], targets may
accept prices below their fundamental value (negative premiums), if they are
ﬁnancially distressed and forced to sell, for example, in ﬁre-sales [Shleifer and
Vishny, 1992]. If distressed targets (or sellers of targets) anticipate suﬃciently
low stand-alone values, they may prefer a going-concern merger, despite negative
premiums.
We derive discriminatory propositions for the three explanations and show
theoretically that the mechanisms behind negative premiums are also able to
explain non-negative VLPs. The empirical tests provide strong support for over-
valuation and for hidden earnouts as most promising explanations for negative
premiums.
Overvaluation of the target's value (Tobins' Q and the price-to-residual-
income-model-value) and of the target's expected merger gains (runups) predict
a higher likelihood of negative premiums. A negative interaction with Tobins's
Q indicates that the positive eﬀects of runups do not only reﬂect a higher valu-
ation of the target, but represent a separate explanation for negative premiums.
Using a sequential logistic model, we further conﬁrm that the announcement of
negative premiums for overvalued targets triggers a negative market reaction by
the target shareholders.
In line with the hidden earnout hypothesis, a number of proxies indicate
that negative premiums are more likely if target shareholders can gain from the
bidder's share of synergies through joint ownership. These include the equity
portion of the deal, bidders' new equity issues to ﬁnance the deal (indicating
the magnitude of transfer of ownership to target shareholders), and relative
target size. We further discriminate between the eﬀects of hidden earnouts
and overvaluation by showing that the market reaction to the announcement of
negative premiums for targets with hidden earnouts is not negative (as in the
case of target overvaluation), but positive.
In line with the market liquidity hypothesis and with Schlingemann et al.
[2002], we ﬁnd that a low monthly M&A transaction value in the target's in-
dustry predicts negative premiums. However, the statistical signiﬁcance is weak
and a closely related measure, the number of monthy M&A deals, lacks any pre-
dictive power. The latter also applies to proxies for the target's stock market
liquidity.
As negative premiums only represent the most extreme and salient form of
VLPs, we ﬁnd, as expected, that the above results can be replicated for all
negative and non-negative premiums in the lowest decile. Quantile regressions
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show that our results on hidden earnouts, overvaluation and market liquidity
apply to all premiums up to the 40th percentile. This is a substantial share of
the takeover market in which the theory of negative premiums is also able to
explain and predict lower positive premiums.
This study adds to the literature on target premiums, which, compared to
the extensive and long standing literature on M&A from the acquirer's perspec-
tive, is still relatively limited. Since the ﬁrst systematic analysis on oﬀer prices
by Bradley [1980], large-sample evidence is only starting to emerge.3 The per-
tinent literature contains papers that primarily focus on antecendents of initial
premiums and papers that analyze the whole bidding process including multiple
bids with intermediate and ﬁnal premiums. The second strand often refers to
bidding strategies in auction settings, or merger negotiations in the shadow of
auctions as outside option [Aktas et al., 2010, Boone and Mulherin, 2008], with
special emphasis on target shareholder free-riding [Grossman and Hart, 1980,
Bradley, 1980], jumps in consecutive and/or competing bids, pre-emptive bid-
ding and the role of toeholds [Fishman, 1988, Betton and Eckbo, 2000, Betton
et al., 2009]. The ﬁrst of the two strands analyzes oﬀer prices and their deter-
minants more directly. Early studies by Huang and Walkling [1987] and Hayn
[1989] show that target premiums are signiﬁcantly greater when oﬀered in cash
than in bidder's stock. Empirical evidence by Ayers et al. [2003] suggests that,
because cash oﬀers include a capital gains tax penalty, target shareholders de-
mand higher cash premiums as compensation. Another premium determinant is
the price-to-book ratio of the target and/or the bidder. Walkling and Edmister
[1985] ﬁnd that the target price-to-book ratio is related to the oﬀer premium.
Dong et al. [2006] report that higher price-to-book ratios of bidders (targets)
are associated with higher (lower) bid premiums, which indicates that targets
accept bidder stock although it is relatively overvalued.4 The public status also
plays a role. While public bidders oﬀer signiﬁcantly higher premiums [Bargeron
et al., 2008], unlisted targets often accept a discount [Oﬃcer, 2007]. Premi-
ums discounts are also reported for ﬁnancially distressed or bankrupt targets
[Hotchkiss et al., 2008]. Deal protection devices such as termination fees and
lockup clauses have been shown to aﬀect premiums positively [Oﬃcer, 2003,
Bates and Lemmon, 2003, Burch, 2001], while shareholder tender agreements
seem to have the opposite eﬀect [Bargeron, 2012]. The majority of tender oﬀers
include such shareholder agreements, which may be a reason why tender oﬀer
premiums are often lower [Eckbo, 2009]. Evidence on takeover hostility and
anti-takeover provisions is mixed [Schwert, 2000, Bates et al., 2008], although
3Please refer to Betton et al. [2008a] and Eckbo [2009] for an excellent survey on the
literature.
4Shleifer and Vishny [2003] provide a behavioral and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan [2004]
a rational explanation for this ﬁnding.
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there is some indication on an inverse relationship between target management
entrenchment and premiums [Moeller, 2005, Hartzell et al., 2004]. Finally, and
as discussed in more detail in Section 2.1, pre-announcement runups can par-
tially substitute premiums although the net eﬀect is, on average, additive [Jarrell
and Poulsen, 1989, Schwert, 1996, Betton et al., 2008b]. Our paper contributes
to this literature by providing a theory and empirical evidence for the existence
of negative premiums. In doing so, we also identify and explain antecendents
for very low premiums.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a the-
oretical model for negative premiums, derives formal propositions and explains
how this research is connected to the existing literature. Section 3 provides a
description of the data sources and outlines the estimates of negative premi-
ums and VLPs in greater detail. Section 4 provides univariate and multivariate
analyses of negative premiums and market reactions to their announcement.
Section 5 shows that the ﬁndings for negative premiums generalize to VLPs up
to the 40th percentile of the premium distribution. Section 6 oﬀers robustness
checks for diﬀerent premium measures. Section 7 summarizes the ﬁndings and
concludes.
2 Theoretical explanations
Many researchers consider negative premiums as noise and exclude them
from their analyses. Indeed, there are several technical reasons, mostly related to
data recording and measurement issues, that can produce such noise. In Section
3, we will discuss these technical reasons in detail as they play an important
role in the selection of a clean sample with unbiased premium measures.
Apart from technical reasons, however, there also exist a number of the-
oretical reasons for negative premiums. Before we discuss these theoretical
explanations , we introduce some basic deﬁnitions.
In line with the pertinent literature [e.g., Betton et al., 2008a] we compute
premiums at the announcement of a takeover oﬀer and refer to them either as
oﬀer premiums or simply as premiums p ∈ (−1,∞), with
p =
b
vT
− 1 (1)
where b > 0 is the initial public bid for a target and vT > 0 is the target's
stand-alone market value prior to this bid. The initial public bid is the very
ﬁrst, publicly announced oﬀer for the target, free of information on subsequent
events such as competing bids. For simplicity, we assume that the target only has
one type of (common) share and that the bidder oﬀers to acquire all outstanding
shares of the target.
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The oﬀer premium p is negative if b < vT . However, despite a negative pre-
mium at the merger announcement, the target shareholders must be convinced
that they will gain from the consummation of the merger. After all, both par-
ties pursue the merger voluntarily. Hence, a theory that explains negative oﬀer
premiums must do so in the light of suﬃciently high post-merger synergies for
the target, so that its shareholders give up their equity. To satisfy this partic-
ipation constraint, the premium that the target shareholders expect to receive
after the consummation of the deal must be positive. We henceforth refer to
this premium as post-merger premium pm ∈ (0,∞).
According to (1), two approaches can explain negative oﬀer premiums: one
that focuses on target's stand-alone valuations and explains why vT > b, and
one that focuses on the initial bid and explains why b < vT . We present the
explanations in this order.
2.1 Target overvaluation
If the target is overvalued, its stand-alone value in (1) may be higher than the
initial public bid, leading to negative premiums at the merger announcement.
For this to occur, two conditions have to be satisﬁed. First, the bidder is able
to estimate the fair value of the target before announcing the bid. This may
particularly but not exclusively apply to solicited bids. For example, Boone
and Mulherin [2007] report that invited bidders often have the opportunity to
conduct several rounds of detailed valuations of the target, including a due
diligence, in order to determine its fair value and possible synergies prior to the
announcement of their oﬀer. Second, based on the target's fair valuation, the
oﬀer premium is smaller than the overvaluation.
Let the target's stand-alone value vT comprise a fair or fundamental value,
vTf > 0, and a possible overvaluation, δ ≥ 0, such that vT = vTf + δ. The
expected joint synergy gains from the takeover, s > 0, are shared such that
the target receives λs, where λ ∈ [0, 1] is determined by bargaining power and
bidder competition. We assume that the bidder oﬀers a fair bid:
b = vTf + λs (2)
Then the oﬀer premium p, as deﬁned in (1), is
p =
vTf + λs
vTf + δ
− 1 = λs− δ
vTf + δ
(3)
If λs ≥ δ, the target's share of joint merger synergies fully compensates for
the overvaluation and the oﬀer premium will be non-negative. However, if δ >
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λs, the oﬀer premium is negative, as summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If the target is suﬃciently overvalued, with δ > λs, a fair bid
b = vTf + λs results in a negative premium p<0.
The post-merger premium will nevertheless be positive. Remember that
the management teams of both merger parties have a consensus view on the
target's fair value. Hence, by ex ante correcting for the overvaluation, such that
δ = 0 in (3), the two parties always negotiate a positive and fair post-merger
premium pm = λs/v
T
f . This implies that the target management accepts the
disclosure of the overvaluation at the merger announcement. A reason could
be that the overvaluation would soon become public knowledge anyway. Target
management may, for example, anticipate that it has to announce unexpectedly
low proﬁts or other bad news to its shareholders. If this, willingly or unwillingly,
coincides with pre-announcement merger negotiations, target management may
choose to rather announce a negative premium than an even worse overvaluation.
Besides the overvaluation of the target's fundamental value, pre-bid runups
play a special role, because they may constitute speculative overvaluation that
is triggered by the merger itself. The conventional view is that runups reﬂect
takeover anticipation based on diverse information, such as other mergers in
the same industry, rumors and speculations in the media, street talk, or any
kind of news that puts the target into play [Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989, Eckbo,
2009]. According to this view, which is referred to as substitution hypothesis,
the runup reﬂects some portion of the target's share of future synergies and
thus partially substitutes the premium. An alternative view is that runups do
not reﬂect future merger gains, but contain new information about the target's
fundamental stand-alone value. A dollar increase in the runup then forces the
bidder to respond by marking up the planned oﬀer price by a dollar. According
to this markup hypothesis, the oﬀer premium is always positive, because if the
runup signals an increase in the target's stand-alone value the markup pricing
follows naturally. Empirical evidence does not provide exclusive support for
the one or the other view. While Jarrell and Poulsen [1989] report results that
are consistent with the substitution hypothesis, Schwert [1996] ﬁnds support
for the markup hypothesis. Betton et al. [2008b] estimate that the initial bid
is marked up by 75-80 percent of the runup and substituted by the remaining
20-25 percent.5
5Note that a positive correlation between runups and premiums, which is the prevalent
test for the markup-hypothesis in the pertinent literature, does not exclude the substitution
hypothesis, because a higher runup could be an indicator for anticipated higher total synergies
and higher premiums [Eckbo, 2009, Betton et al., 2008b]. Hence, the 'markup' could be
determined before the runup, which would support the substitution hypothesis. Consistent
with this view, Betton et al. [2008b] report that bidders abnormal anncouncement returns
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Even if average runups do not fully substitute post-merger premiums, their
outliers may nevertheless be extreme enough to produce negative premiums;
in particular, when we consider that negative premiums are also exceptions to
the rule.6 To see this, substitute δ in (3) by E (λs), which represents target's
expected merger gains that are anticipated in a directly substituting runup.7
Hence, the oﬀer premium decreases in E (λs). At E (λs) = λs the runup per-
fectly anticipates the premium, resulting in p = 0. The key for negative pre-
miums is that substituting runups reﬂect expectations. Thus, there is room for
error. Analogous to Proposition (1), where investors can overestimate a target's
fundamental value, here investors can overestimate a target's actual gain from
the merger, so that E (λs) > λs. Hence, if the anticipation of merger gains is
overly optimistic, an excessive runup increases the denominator in (3) above the
fair bid (vTf +E (λs) > v
T
f +λs), which results in a negative oﬀer premium. We
summarize this in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If a runup (i) substitutes and (ii) overestimates the target's
share of future synergies, so that E (λs) > λs, then a fair bid b = vTf + λs
results in a negative premium p<0.
If a target is suﬃciently overvalued, either in its stand-alone value or in
its merger gains (runup), Proposition (1) and (2) show that it cannot avoid a
negative premium in a merger announcement. In argumentum e contrario, if
a target announces a negative premium due to overvaluation, the shareholders
will correct this overvaluation with negative abnormal announcement returns,
as summarized in the following proposition.8
Proposition 3. If a target's fundamental value vTf , or its merger gains λs, or
both, are suﬃciently overestimated, such that δ > λs or E(λs) > λs in (3), the
target's abnormal announcement return to negative premiums is negative.
are positively correlated with target runups, which supports the notion that runups are an
empirical proxy for total takeover synergies in the cross-section.
6Edmans et al. [2012] show that merger expectation can produce substituting runups that
are high enough to deter the anticipated bid.
7E(λs) reﬂects the probability to merge (Prob(M)) and the conditionally expected pre-
mium E(λs|M).
8For simplicity in our model, deﬁne announcement returns as vTt+1/v
T
t−1 − 1, with vTt−1 =
vTf + δ, or v
T
t−1 = v
T
f + E(λs), and v
T
t+1 = v
T
f + λs, where t − 1 and t + 1 correspond to
pre- and post-announcement dates, respectively. The proposition also holds, without loss of
generality, for abnormal announcement returns.
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2.2 Hidden earnout
When the stand-alone value of the target prior to the initial merger announce-
ment is fair, then, according to (1), only a bid that is lower than the fair
stand-alone value can explain negative premiums. One of the usual suspects
for lower-than-fair valuations is agency costs, but, as discussed in Section 2.4,
agency theory is not able to explain negative premiums. A diﬀerent approach
to explain bids that are lower than a target's fair stand-alone value, is to look at
their form of payment. Here, a distinction must be made between stock-swaps
and other forms of payment, such as cash or debt issued by the acquirer to
target shareholders. In stock-swaps the acquirer partially transfers ownership
and, in doing so, eﬀectively pays more than the announced premium for the
target. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as the `cost of stock mergers'
[Brealey et al., 2011, p.832] and is best explained with a numerical example:
Assume an acquirer A and a target T with fair stand-alone values
of 200 and 100 mil U$, respectively. Suppose A buys T for a total
consideration of 110 mil U$, payable in A's shares, and that the
total synergies of the deal are 50 mil U$. For simplicity, assume
that each U$ in valuation equals one common share outstanding.
Hence, A issues 110 mil new shares, acquires T in a stock swap with
an announced premium of 10% and expects to gain 40 mil U$ (50-
10). After the consummation of the deal, the merged entity is worth
350 mil U$, has 310 mil shares outstanding and a share price 1.129
U$. Now, the 110 mil shares of T's shareholders are worth 124.2
mil U$, but the gains for A's shareholders dropped to 25.8 mil U$
(350-200-124.2), down from announced gains of 40 mil U$. Thus,
the cost of stock mergers for A is 14.2 mil U$ (40-25.8).
The crucial insight for our purposes is that a cost to the acquirer is a gain
for the target. In the example, target shareholders received ownership of 35.5
percent (110/310) of the merged entity and therefore gain, after the merger, an
additional 35.5 percent of the acquirer's share of merger synergies, amounting to
14.2 mil U$ (.355 · 40). This results in an post-merger premium of 24.2 percent,
while the oﬀer premium is only 10 percent. In the following, we show how the
cost of stock mergers can explain negative premiums.
When the bidder pays the target with stock, the merger agreement speciﬁes
an exchange ratio X. This ratio is the number of bidder shares to be exchanged
for each target share, assuming a fair bid price b, as in (2), for each target's
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share in relation to the fair stand-alone share price of the bidder, such that
X =
b
NT
KB
=
b
NT
· N
B
vBf
(4)
with KB = vBf /N
B denoting the bidder's pre-bid share price, NT and NB
the number of shares outstanding of the target and acquirer, respectively, and
vBf the stand-alone market value of the bidder.
9 For simplicity, we ﬁrst assume
that both parties have only common stock outstanding and that X refers to
payments that only contain stock.10
Solving (4) for b deﬁnes the total value of the initial public bid at the an-
nouncement of a pure stock-for-stock merger
b = X ·NT ·KB (5)
Substituting (5) in (1), determines the announcement premium
p =
X ·NT ·KB
vTf
− 1 = X ·N
T · vBf
NB · vTf
− 1 (6)
After the consummation of the merger, the value of the shares that the target's
owners received as payment is determined by the share price KM of the merged
entity and not by the pre-bid share price KB of the bidder. The post-merger
share price
KM =
vBf + v
T
f + s
NB +X ·NT (7)
reﬂects not only the pre-merger values of the bidder and the target, vBf + v
T
f ,
but also the post-merger value of the synergies s, divided by the total number
of post-merger stock outstanding. As the share exchange ratio X is ﬁxed, it
reﬂects the number of post-merger shares in the combined ﬁrm that the target's
owners hold per pre-merger share. Consequently, the post-merger value per
original target share is X ·KM , and the total post-merger value of the bid is
bm = X ·NT ·KM (8)
9This is a standard textbook approach. See, e.g., DePamphilis [2008, p.374-377].
10For example, if the oﬀer price is $40 per target share, and the bidder's stand-alone share
price is $80, the share exchange ratio in a pure stock-swap merger is X = 40/80 = .5. This
implies that the acquirer will give .5 shares of its own stock for each target share. If the
stock portion e of the bid is less than 100%, the exchange rate X is multiplied with the
stock portion e. If e = .75, the target receives $10 per share as a lump-sum payment plus
X · e = .5 · .75 = .375 bidder shares per target share.
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Analogously to (6), the post-merger premium can be deﬁned using (7) and
(8).
pm =
X ·NT ·KM
vTf
− 1 = X ·N
T
NB +X ·NT ·
vBf + v
T
f + s
vTf
− 1 (9)
If the share exchange ratio X is not revised and if the underlying stand-alone
values vBf + v
T
f are unaﬀected by the merger, the post-merger premium solely
depends on the actual realization of the expected synergies s.11 Note that the
right hand side (RHS) of (9) contains the target's fraction of post-merger equity
ownership in the combined ﬁrm
ξ =
X ·NT
NB +X ·NT (10)
Hence, the extent to which the post-merger premium is contingent on the
realization of the expected synergies depends on the fraction ξ of total stock
that the former owners of the target hold in the merged company. This logic is
illustrated in a takeover proposal for the Dutch bank ABN Amro. In a letter
to the Chairman of ABN Amro, a bidder consortium of three banks, the Royal
Bank of Scotland (RBS), Fortis, and Santander, argued as follows:
As our Oﬀer [...] will comprise approximately 70 per cent in
cash, the element of potential uncertainty about the value relates
only to 30 per cent of our Oﬀer [...]. Furthermore, the shares to
be issued by RBS would constitute broadly 20 per cent of RBS's
current issued share capital [...]. It can also be assumed that ABN
AMRO has an underlying value before synergies [of] [...] approxi-
mately 70 per cent of the current value of our price indication. Thus,
theoretically at most 30 per cent of the total consideration would be
dependent on synergy realization. Therefore it could be argued that
from the perspective of an ABN AMRO shareholder, the proportion
of the value of our possible oﬀer that relates to the realization of
synergies is the product of these three percentages (i.e. 30% x 20%
x 30%).12
11Although a revision of the exchange ratio before consummation of the deal is possible, it
would simply constitute a new bid b.
12Letter of Maurice Lippens (Fortis), Sir Fred Goodwin (RBS), Emilio Botin (San-
tander), and Jean-Paul Votron (Fortis) to Mr Rijkman Groenink (ABN AMRO),
dated May 3, 2007 (SEC ﬁling Form 6-K of May 15, 2007, downloadable at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/844150/000119312507114485/d6k.htm)
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The letter eﬀectively announces an equity-based earnout. It explains which
portion of the oﬀer is contingent on the realization of the target's share of
merger synergies. This portion is henceforth referred to as announced earnout,
deﬁned as pia = e · ξ · (λs/b) with e denoting the equity portion the bid b.13 The
letter implies that, by including the announced earnout pia, the post-merger
premium is equal to the oﬀer premium of 42.9 percent (λs/vTf = .3/.7). This
logic builds on the assumption that ABN Amro receives all synergies from the
merger, so that λ = 1.14
RBS, however, intends to gain from the merger, so that λ < 1. It will there-
fore expect additional synergies ((1− λ) s > 0), which, if realized as expected,
increase the post-merger share price. As ABN Amro's shareholders are paid
in stock, they will also beneﬁt from RBS's share of synergies. This eﬀectively
raises the post-merger premiums above the oﬀer premium.15
Hence, if λ < 1, the target shareholders receive two types of equity-based
earnout: one that is announced and one that is hidden. The latter, henceforth
referred to as hidden earnout pih, is not directly included in the oﬀer premium,
as the announced earnout pia, but hidden in the post-merger premium, which
includes the bidder's share of synergies.16 The relationship between the two
premiums therefore is
pm = p+ pih (11)
Note that the amount oﬀered in cash is identical for both premiums. By
inserting (6) and (9) in (11) the hidden earnout of the initial bid's equity portion
13Note that ξ refers to the target's fraction of post-merger equity ownership in a 100 percent
stock merger. The letter erroneously uses the pre-merger fraction of equity that RBS would
need to ﬁnance only 30 percent of target stock. This neglects (i) the post-merger dilution of
the newly issued shares and (ii) and includes the stock portion of the deal twice: once in the
20 percent of issued equity and once as a separately mentioned variable. For a pure stock
merger RBS would have to issue 66.6¯ percent (1/.3 · .2) of its equity. This is equivalent to
40 percent (.6/1.6) of post-merger equity ownership without cash portion. Hence, given a
30 percent stock portion, 3.6 percent (.3 · .4 · .3) and not 1.8 percent (.3 · .2 · .3) of the bid
constitute the announced earnout.
14To see this, let p = pm (using (6) and (9)) and solve for X which yields X =((
vTf + s
)
·NB
)
/NT ·vBf . If the announced bid is b = vTf +λs, the negotiated share exchange
rate X in (4) only includes the target's share of synergies λs. Substituting b = vTf + λs in 4
yields X =
((
vTf + λs
)
·NB
)
/NT · vBf . Thus, p = pm only holds if λ = 1.
15For example, suppose that the total synergies s in the takeover quoted in the letter are
equally shared between RBS and ABN Amro (λ = .5) and that they are expected to be twice
as high as ABN Amro's share (s = 2λs). Then, ABN Amro's additional gain from RBS's
share of synergies ((1− λ) s = .5s) is equal to the announced earnout (3.6 percentage points).
Thus, while the oﬀer premium, which includes the announced earnout, remains at 42.9 percent
(.3/.7), the post-merger premium increases to 48 percent ((.3 + .036) /.7).
16Hidden earnouts are also the crucial diﬀerence between equity-based earnouts and cash
earnouts, which are future cash payments that are contingent upon some observable measure
of performance. As cash earnouts have no hidden component, they can be fully integrated
into the oﬀer premium, either with the maximum amount (e.g., in SDC bid data) or with an
expected value.
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e ∈ [0, 1] is deﬁned as
pih = e · (pm − p) = e ·
ξ ·
(
vBf + v
T
f + s
)
− b
vTf
(12)
Using (1) and (12), (11) can be written as follows.
pm =
b
vTf
− 1 + e ·
ξ ·
(
vBf + v
T
f + s
)
− b
vTf
=
b
vTf
(1− e)− 1 + e ·
ξ ·
(
vBf + v
T
f + s
)
vTf
(13)
The ﬁrst part of the upper RHS in (13), represents the oﬀer premium p, while
the second part of the upper RHS represents the additional premium due to the
hidden earnout. The ﬁrst (second) part of the lower RHS in (13), represents
the post-merger premium of the cash (stock) portion of the deal. We can now
show the following (see appendix for the formal proof):
Lemma 1. If hidden earnouts are suﬃciently high, oﬀer premiums can be neg-
ative (p < 0), while (i) post-merger premiums are positive (pm ≥ 0) and (ii) the
acquirer gains control over the target (ξ < .5).
Proposition 4. Hidden earnouts, and their possibility to compensate for nega-
tive premiums, increase in the stock portion e of the payment, and in the target's
fraction of post-merger equity ownership ξ.
Hence, hidden earnouts can explain negative premiums (Lemma), and, as
hidden earnouts increase in the target's exposure to the bidder's share of syn-
ergies (Proposition 4), so does the likelihood for negative premiums.
The question remains why a target would accept an oﬀer with such a high
portion of hidden earnouts that the premium turns negative. We ﬁnd that the
relative size of the target plays a crucial role (see appendix for the formal proof).
Proposition 5. Bidders can maximize their payment in stock without losing
majority control to the target (ξ < .5), while keeping the post-merger premium
> 0, if the relative size of the target satisﬁes vTf /v
B
f ≤
(
vBf − λs
)
/vBf . If the
relative size of the target increases, the oﬀer premium must be smaller or even
negative, in order to guarantee majority control.
The most intuitive explanation of Proposition (5) refers to the extreme case
where a target's fair market capitalization exceeds the bidder's value. Here,
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the only solution to pay with bidder shares without losing majority control
(ξ ≥ .5) is a negative premium. The larger the target, the smaller the (negative)
premium that is needed to stay in control, and the higher the hidden earnout
that the bidder needs to oﬀer the target as compensation.
To develop a proposition on the market reaction to negative premiums with
hidden earnouts, ﬁrst note that it is impossible to make a bid without a hid-
den earnout if the bidder wants to gain from a merger (λ  1) and pay with
ownership (e  0). Any attempt to engineer a share exchange rate in (4)
that fully includes an anticipated hidden earnout would fail, because it could
not completely exclude target shareholders from enjoying the joint post-merger
synergies, which include the portion 1− λ that was allocated to the bidder. As
the latter enters the bid b in (2), any attempt to fully integrate hidden earnouts
ex ante into the share exchange rate in (4) does not converge to a solution.
Hence, if hidden earnouts exist, they cannot be explicitly included in the
oﬀer premium. This triggers target shareholders to correct oﬀer premiums with
positive announcement returns in the magnitude of the hidden earnout.17 How-
ever, the fact that hidden earnouts are present in all stock mergers with λ < 1
increases the chance that the market reaction to a hidden earnout is confounded
with overvaluation.18 In fact, while overvalued mergers with e  0 and λ  1
always have a hidden earnout (as shown above), it is not a given that mergers
with a hidden earnout, e 0, and λ 1 are always overvalued. This suggests
that the positive market reaction to hidden earnouts is biased towards the neg-
ative market reaction to overvaluation. Thus, although negative announcement
returns identify overvaluation in negative premiums, as shown in Proposition
(3), they do not reliably identify hidden earnouts.
However, referring back to (1), we can discriminate the eﬀects of hidden
earnouts from Proposition (3) by benchmarking the market reaction to the bid
b = vTf + λs instead of the target's market capitalization v
T . Benchmarking
against b discriminates between cases where the post-announcement value of
the target vTt+1 = b + pih · vTf (i) exceeds bid b, because of expected hidden
earnouts (pih > 0); or (ii) does not exceed bid b, because of the absence of
hidden earnouts (pih = 0).
19 We summarize this in the following proposition.
17Suppose a target with a fair value of 100 accepts a stock-for-stock bid of 90 with a hidden
earnout of 20. Then, the oﬀer premium is negative (90/100−1), but the target's announcement
return is positive, as the post-merger premium is positive ((90 + 20) /100− 1).
18Suppose an overvalued target with a market capitalization of 100 and a fair value of 80
accepts a stock-for-stock bid of 90 with a hidden earnout of 5. Then the oﬀer premium is
negative (90/ (80 + 20)− 1), the post-merger premium is positive ((90 + 5) /80− 1), but the
target's announcement return is negative, as the market capitalization falls from 100 to 95.
19With hidden earnouts, the target's post-announcement capitalization in Footnote 18 is
vTt+1 = 95, which exceeds the bid b = 90. Without hidden earnouts, the market reaction
would reduce the target capitalization to vTt+1 = b = 90, and, when including a discount for
merger completion risk, to vTt+1 < b = 90.
15
Proposition 6. If a bid b = vTf + λs is announced with hidden earnouts (pih >
0), the target's post-announcement value vTt+1 = b+ pih · vTf exceeds b, such that
the post-announcement premium b/vTt+1 − 1 is negative. This market reaction
also applies to negative oﬀer premiums (b < vTf ⇒ p < 0) with pih > 0.
Our model assumes that the exchange rate between target and bidder shares
is ﬁxed. If exchange rates are ﬂexible, the bidder announces an amount per
target share, e.g., 10 U$, payable in bidder shares. The exchange ratio in (4)
is then an outcome of this amount and is speciﬁed as close as possible to the
eﬀective date of the merger. This insulates target stockholders from volatility
in the bidder's stock price. Although the oﬀer premium is not based on the
exchange ratio in (4), the form of payment, however, is still in stocks. Hence,
target shareholders will still receive hidden earnouts, which, if suﬃciently large,
enable negative premiums.20
2.3 Market liquidity
In a liquid market investors can sell their assets without a signiﬁcant loss
in the value of their investment. If there is limited interest, however, they may
ﬁnd it diﬃcult to sell without oﬀering a liquidity or marketability discount. The
pertinent literature distinguishes between liquidity in the stock market and in
the market for corporate control.
Empirical studies that speciﬁcally focus on the relationship between stock
liquidity and takeover premiums report mixed results. Massa and Xu [2011]
argue that public acquirers prefer a high liquidity of target's shares and reﬂect
this in higher premiums. Yet, Chung and Lee [2011] show that poor liquidity of
target stock is positively related to abnormal returns to the target (which can
be interpreted as a proxy for premiums), as post-merger liquidity improvement
is priced in.
For the market of corporate control, Schlingemann et al. [2002] show that
ﬁrms are more likely to divest subsidiaries in industries with a high merger
and acquisition activity in the recent past. Although ﬁrms prefer to sell the
most liquid corporate assets, liquidity discounts and even negative premiums are
20 The same applies to collar provisions, which are a mixture of ﬁxed and variable exchange
rates. Like ﬂexible exchange rates , they also make the bid more cash-like and less contingent
for target shareholders [Oﬃcer, 2004, 2006]. Collars deﬁne ﬂoors and/or caps for bidder stock
prices within which the exchange ratio is ﬁxed. Outside of this range the exchange ratio is
adjusted up or down. In the course of such an adjustment, an originally negative premium
may become positive. This is consistent with our model, as a collar breach would constitute
a completely new bid with, in this case, a positive premium.
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possible if shareholders are forced to sell, as in ﬁre-sales [Shleifer and Vishny,
1992]. Fire-sale discounts result when the observed selling price of distressed
or bankrupt assets is below their fundamental value (the value in best alterna-
tive use). Several studies present evidence on ﬁre-sale discounts [e.g., Pulvino,
1998, 1999, Ramey and Shapiro, 2001, Acharya et al., 2007]. Their antecedents
comprise a number of temporary demand-side conditions that can attenuate in-
dustry rivals' willingness or ability to bid for a bankrupt target. These include
industry debt overhang [Clayton and Ravid, 2002] and wider ﬁnancial distress,
which tends to be contagious within an industry [Lang and Stulz, 1992].
A central condition in our model is that the post-merger premium has to be
positive. In other words, despite being forced to sell below a fair market value,
e.g., due to (imminent) bankruptcy or ﬁnancial distress, the owners of the target
still have to gain in comparison with all other options. Here two assumptions
come into play. First, if the target, as a going-concern entity, is not taken over
within a certain time frame, its ultimate value for the target shareholders is even
lower. Eckbo and Thorburn [2008], for example, only ﬁnd evidence of ﬁre-sale
discounts in (Swedish) bankruptcy auctions that lead to piecemeal liquidation,
but not in going-concern sales of targets.21 Second, due to diﬀerences between
ﬁrms or market imperfections, the bidder is able to employ the same corporate
assets more eﬃciently than the (seller of the) target. According to the Q-theory
of mergers, corporate assets are re-allocated from low-Q sellers to high-Q buyers
[Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002]. Jensen [1991] argues that bankruptcy sales are
an important mechanism for the eﬃcient redeployment of assets.
In liquid markets, competition between heterogeneous bidders is likely to
bid up the premium into positive territory. Eckbo and Thorburn [2008] report
that just ﬁve interested bidders and three actual bids in a typical going-concern
bankruptcy auction appear to be suﬃcient to counter potential ﬁre-sale tenden-
cies. In less liquid markets, however, a target may be forced to bargain with only
one bidder. Even if this bidder is able to pay more, a negative premium may
be the best outcome for a target, particularly if liquidation is its only outside
option.22
In the framework of our model, a bidder would be able and, in a liquid
market, also willing to bid b = vTf +λs, while the target's shareholders anticipate
a liquidation value of 0 ≤ vTl < vTf as the target's ultimate value without
21Merger talks are therefore often initiated by distressed targets in order to avoid bankruptcy
or preempt liquidation. Thorburn [2000] and Eckbo and Thorburn [2008] present evidence
that many targets privately work out an acquisition agreement just prior to bankruptcy ﬁlings,
so-called 'prepacks'.
22Boone and Mulherin [2007] show that about half of all targets negotiate with a single
bidder. Interestingly, they also ﬁnd that abnormal returns for target shareholders as well as
premiums are comparable with auctions to multiple bidders. However, they do not speciﬁcally
focus on distressed targets and/or low market liquidity.
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takeover.23 In an illiquid market, a liquidity discount l ∈ [0, 1] can reduce the
bid b = vTf + λs either (i) by an amount equal or less than the target's share
of merger synergies 0 < lb ≤ λs, resulting in a lower, but non-negative oﬀer
premium p = (b− lb) /vTf − 1 > 0, or (ii) by more than the target's gains,
lb > λs, which results in a negative oﬀer premium, p = (b− lb) /vTf − 1 < 0.
The post-merger premium that refers to the liquidation value vTl is pm = lb/v
T
l ,
which is positive as the target's shareholders relate the bid lb > vTl to the
liquidation value as the only other possible outcome. We summarize this as
follows:
Proposition 7. If (i) liquidity discounts are suﬃciently high (l > λs/b), (ii)
distressed targets anticipate suﬃciently low non-takeover values for the target
(0 ≤ vTl < vTf ), and (iii) bidders assume a target value of vTf , then oﬀer premi-
ums p = (b− lb) /vTf − 1 are negative, while post-merger premiums pm = lb/vTl
are positive.
Although Proposition (7) is framed for the market of corporate control, it
applies in extension, but arguably to a lesser extent, to stock market liquidity.
The empirical tests therefore include liquidity measures for the stock market
and the market of corporate control.
2.4 Agency
If the target's managers privately beneﬁt from selling the target below its
fair value, agency theory suggests that they propose or at least support such a
deal. At the announcement of such a merger, we would observe a negative oﬀer
premium, but, by design, the realized post-merger premium would also have to
be negative. Hence, the target shareholders will not support the merger, because
their participation constraint as principals is not satisﬁed. Anticipating this, it
makes no sense for target managers to announce a merger below fair market
value if the deal is purely motivated by self-interest.
This is diﬀerent for positive premiums, after correcting for agency costs.
Even if positive premiums with agency costs are lower than without, share-
holders may participate in the merger as they still expect a gain. The em-
pirical evidence on positive target premiums and agency costs is mixed and
type-dependent. While Bargeron et al. [2009] ﬁnd no relation with target CEO
retention, Hartzell et al. [2004] report a negative correlation with cash pay-
ments for target CEOs, and Moeller [2005] a negative and a positive relation
with target shareholder control in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively.
23For simplicity we assume a liquidation value, but, in principle, target shareholders can
anticipate any future stand-alone value that is lower than vTf .
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If the post-merger premium with agency costs is positive, the oﬀer premium
is also positive. Thus, agency theory alone cannot explain negative premiums,
but it may play a role in explaining non-negative VLPs. Given the mixed eﬀects
of agency on negative and non-negative VLPs, we will empirically test for agency
costs, but refrain from deriving separate propositions.
2.5 Generalization to VLPs
Negative premiums are the most extreme and distinctive outcome of the much
larger phenomenon of VLPs, which also include non-negative premiums. The
very same theory that explains negative premiums also applies to VLPs. Ac-
cordingly, all of the above propositions generalize to VLPs. Propositions (4)
to (6) on hidden earnouts directly apply to VLPs. For the remaining proposi-
tions, substitute δ > λs by 0 < δ in Propositions (1) and (3), E (λs) > λs by
0 < E (λs) in Propositions (2) and (3), l > λs/b by 0 < l in Proposition (7),
and exchange the term 'negative premium' with 'VLP'. Propositions (1) and (2)
then predict lower premiums (negative, zero, or positive), and Proposition (3)
lower announcement returns, than without overvaluation or liquidity discounts.
3 Data and deﬁnitions
3.1 Sample design
The sample is constructed from Securities Data Corporation International Merger
and Acquisition Database (SDC) and contains oﬀers that are announced in the
years from 1995 to 2011. We include both completed and withdrawn oﬀers
subject to the following selection criteria.24 The transaction has an economi-
cally signiﬁcant value of 10 mil U$ or more. Targets and bidders have Standard
Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) codes outside the ranges 60006999 (ﬁnancials)
and 49004999 (regulated utilities) to ensure that regulatory constraints do not
aﬀect the occurrence of negative premiums. Bidders seek to acquire full control
over the target, both ﬁrms are incorporated in the US and have common shares
listed for which price and return data are available in Datastream.25
There are several technical issues and special cases that can produce nega-
tive premiums in the data. Negative premiums can be caused by a reverse stock
split or a dividend payout that the target announces together with a negotiated
merger bid. Hence, we use stock prices that are adjusted for dividends and stock
24For studies with similar criteria see, e.g., Schlingemann [2004], Dong et al. [2006], Helwege
et al. [2007].
25Acquirers and targets in SDC are matched with Datastream using SEDOLs and CUSIPs.
The SDC CUSIPs are recoded into Datastream local codes [LOC] by adding a country preﬁx.
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splits. If a target receives several bids by the same or competing bidders, we
exclude all but the very ﬁrst oﬀer to minimize any confounding events.26 All
acquisitions with the same immediate or ultimate parent are eliminated from
the sample to exclude negative premiums that arise through internal reorgani-
zation or through ﬁnancial restructuring with repurchases or self-tenders. We
also exclude all partial acquisitions, asset sales or multiple acquisitions on the
same day with the same bidder or seller.27 Negative premiums are also common
in reverse mergers that allow privately held companies to obtain a listing on a
public exchange without an IPO.28 For this reason, and for reasons of limited
data availability, we exclude private targets from our sample. Another techni-
cal reason for negative premiums can be mandatory oﬀers, where a bidder is
required by law to make an oﬀer for the remaining shares of the target.29 To
keep our sample as clean as possible we therefore require that bidders have no
toeholds and make an oﬀer for 100 percent of target shares. We also focus on
deals in the US, where there is no general mandatory bid requirement.30 Fi-
nally, we exclude all spinoﬀs, recapitalizations, self-tenders, repurchases, deals
with a government controlled entity, and deals where the announcement date is
estimated. After this selection procedure, we manually checked the stock prices,
announcement dates and merger ﬁlings (published by the SEC) of all targets
with negative premiums, but did not ﬁnd any other technical, legal or tax re-
lated explanations. The ﬁnal sample consists of 1937 deals with non-missing
oﬀer premiums in SDC and, after a match with Datastream, 1776 deals without
missing values for empirical analysis.
26A comparison of initial and ﬁnal bids in SDC reveals that roughly half of all follow-up
bids are downward adjustments.
27For example, parallel asset sales can hollow out a target and result in a low bid for
its shares. If several subsidiaries are bought together (e.g., individual hotels from the same
seller) tax reasons can make it worthwhile to negotiate negative premiums for some with high
premiums for others as a compensation.
28 The public acquiring vehicle (often shell corporations) is merged into the private target
in a share exchange deal that allows the target to gain controlling ownership of the surviving
entity [Gleason et al., 2005].
29 For example, in March 2007, Porsche triggered a mandatory takover bid by raising
its stake in Volkswagen (VW) to over 30 percent. As Porsche did not intend to purchase
the remaining shares of VW, they oﬀered a price below the current market price of VW.
Consequently, in SDC, the deal (#1852060040) is recorded with a negative premium of -14.4
percent.
30 However, in certain states, if a bidder acquires a certain percentage of the target (20%
in Pennsylvania, 25% in Maine, 50% in South Dakota), other shareholders can demand that
the bidder purchase their shares at a fair price (`control share cash-out' provision).
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3.2 Premium measures
In deﬁning the premium, we take the perspective of the target's shareholder
on the open market and use the oﬀer price that the bidder announces to pay
per outstanding target common share, as reported in SDC. If there are multiple
bids, we use the initial oﬀer. With oﬀer prices, premium estimation is reduced
to ﬁnding the best `base' price with which to scale the known oﬀer price.
[Eckbo, 2009, p.154] As the correct base price is principally unknown, we apply
two methods to deﬁne the base price and, in extension, negative announcement
premiums.
First, we use the target's pre-bid secondary market price which the bidder
relies on in order to determine the initial oﬀer premiums. To ensure that this
base price is largely free of leakage of information and market anticipation of
the pending oﬀer, we select a target share price four weeks (20 trading days)
prior to the announcement day t, henceforth t = −20. Selecting an earlier date
has the advantage that it minimizes the inclusion of runups, but it also opens
the window for more confounding events between the date of the base price and
the oﬀer. For robustness checks, we also use base prices eight weeks (t = −40),
one week (t = −5) and one day (t = −1) prior to the announcement.
Second, we adjust the base price (and thus the premium) with the market
return between the date of the base price and the announcement of the oﬀer
[Krishnan et al., 2007]. With this method we control for negative premiums
that are due to adverse market movements where the valuation of the whole
market and not only of the target drops.31 Empirically, however, the diﬀerences
between an unadjusted and market-adjusted premium are negligible (also see
Section 4.1). Based on the four week measure (t = −20), the number of negative
premiums actually increases from 154 to 162 after adjusting for stock market
movements. Most of our models refer to the four week premium (t = −20), in
percent and adjusted for changes in the S&P 500, as the standard measure.32
If not reported otherwise, we refer to the lowest decile of the standard premium
measure as VLPs. The results reported in this paper are robust to the other
premium measures and also other cutoﬀ points for VLPs (see Section 6).
The consideration paid by the acquirer often diﬀers from the price received
31 Suppose, the target's base price is 10 at a market index of 100. A month later the index
crashed to 50 and a bid is announced to buy the target for 8. At face value, the announcement
premium is negative (8/10-1), but not if we adjust the base price by the -50 percent market
return (8/5-1).
32 We compute the premium as follows: (bid per target share / target share at t = −20) -
(S&P500 at t = 0 / S&P500 at t = −20), multiplied by 100 for a percentage measure.
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by the target shareholders. This may suggest to use the takeover considera-
tion for an alternative premium measurement. There are, however, several data
issues with the total consideration reported in SDC. First, next to capital infu-
sions and liabilities assumed, the total consideration also includes the purchase
of options, preferred shares, assets, warrants, and common like shares. All these
items are not included in the data on the target's market value prior to the an-
nouncement, which refers to common shares outstanding. Hence, to align the
bid with the target's base price, all the above items have to be subtracted indi-
vidually from the total consideration. This leads to large outliers and requires
quite arbitrary truncation methods [Oﬃcer, 2003]. Second, any stock portion
in the total consideration (incl. common stock) is valued at the last day before
the ﬁnal bid is announced. Thus, if bids are revised or rivaled, any premium
that is based on the total consideration is (i) confounded by the whole bidding
process; and (ii) does not refer to the oﬀer value at the announcement date,
but to an unknown point in time several months or even years later. Third, the
consideration paid includes all target stock purchases made within six months of
the announcement date. Again, as above, critique (i) and (ii) apply. Moreover,
if the takeover process exceeds six months, any purchases of target stock after
this period underestimate the premium. In sum, the total consideration is too
confounded to reliably identify negative premiums. Moreover, we refrain from
using the total consideration to prevent mixed perspectives in our analysis. In
this paper we are primarily interested in the target shareholders' perspective
and why they accept negative premiums, less so why acquirers may accept a
higher consideration than the price received by the target.
3.3 Construction of variables
3.3.1 Overvaluation
There is no generally accepted measure of overvaluation; hence, we use several
proxies in line with the literature. The main issue is that a high measure might
suggest overvaluation or high expectations concerning future growth and prof-
itability, as suggested by Q-theory [Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002]. Tobin's Q
is nevertheless a widely used measure of overvaluation. We compute Tobin's Q
for the target (TQ_t) and the bidder (TQ_b) as the ratio of the market value
of assets over the book value of assets at t = −20. As in Masulis et al. [2007],
the market value of assets is deﬁned as the book value of assets minus the book
value of common equity plus the market value of common equity. Dong et al.
[2006] use the price-to-residual-income-model-value (PRIMV) to capture over-
valuation. The PRIMV refers to the Ohlson model and is based on earnings
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forecasts [Ohlson, 1995].33 Dong et al. [2006] determine the cost of equity using
a market model to estimate beta. Yet, they admit substantial variation in their
estimates, which they resolve with winsorization. Even after winsorization, the
cost of equity estimates lead to extreme fundamental values, as estimates vary
between 3% and 30%. To avoid outliers, we follow DMello and Shroﬀ [2000] and
use a constant discount rate of 12.5%. Furthermore, in line with Dong et al.
[2006], the computation refers to a three year window.
Based on the functional ﬁxation hypothesis, ﬁrms with high accruals and
net operating assets tend to be overvalued, because investors overstate account-
ing performance [Hirshleifer et al., 2004, Sloan, 1996]. Thus, for robustness,
we also compute operating accruals (ACCR) and net operating assets (NOA)
as discussed in Hirshleifer et al. [2004, p.306-307]. Unfortunately, quarterly
accounting data do not cover the whole investigation period. Therefore, all
accounting-related measures, including ACCR and NOA, use the latest avail-
able annual data prior to the bid announcement.
In order to analyze the market response to overvaluation, we follow Brown
and Warner's [1985] standard event study methodology to compute cumulative
abnormal returns to the bidder (CAR_b) and the target (CAR_t) for the two-
day event window (-1, 1) starting with the closing price one day before the
announcement. We estimate the market-adjusted model ARi = ri − rm, where
ARi is the acquirer i's abnormal return, ri is the stock return on acquirer i and
rm is the return of the S&P 500 index. Following Fuller et al. [2002] and Dong
et al. [2006], we do not estimate market parameters based on a time period before
each bid, because there is a high probability that previous takeover attempts
would be included in the estimation period. This would make beta estimations
less meaningful.
Schwert [1996] and Betton et al. [2009] report that the main abnormal price
change preceding a merger occurs about 10 to 15 days prior to the announce-
ment. To measure runups (RUNUP) we therefore use a window from t = −20
to t = −1 for which we compute S&P 500 adjusted buy and hold returns to the
target.
3.3.2 Hidden earnout
In line with Section 2.2, hidden earnouts are more likely if the percentage of
consideration paid in stock (EQ) is large and if the acquirer has to issue a sub-
stantial portion of new equity (NEW_EQ). NEW_EQ is the number of com-
33Dong et al. [2006] use I/B/E/S data to obtain analysts' consensus earnings forecasts.
Analysts' forecasts are not available for most targets, and the number of forecasts is a crucial
factor regarding the precision of the measure. Hence, we use actual earnings and not forecast
earnings to construct the price-to-residual-income-model-value.
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mon shares issued in the transaction divided by the total number of acquirer's
outstanding shares (after issuance). Both variables are from SDC. Moreover,
the relative size (RSIZE) of the target matters, which we deﬁne as the ratio of
target over bidder market capitalization at t = −20. Our model predicts that
hidden earnouts depend on merger gains. Given an acquirer's share of joint
synergies (1 − λ) the potential for a hidden earnout increases in total merger
synergies. In the absence of a precise measure for synergies, we compute the
target's operational proﬁtability (ROIC), cost-income ratio (CI ) and capital
turnover (TURNOVER) as imperfect proxies for synergy potential. ROIC is
earnings before interest and taxes over ﬁxed assets, CI refers to operating costs
over revenues, and TURNOVER is revenues over ﬁxed assets.
As discussed in section 2.2, the market response to hidden earnouts can
be measured with post-announcement premiums, which relate the bid to the
target's post-bid stock price. For this, we use the standard premium measure
as deﬁned in Section 3.2, but with a base price at t = 5.34 We chose a post-bid
window of ﬁve trading days so that, on the one hand, the market has time to
compound potential hidden earnouts into the target's stock price, while, on the
other hand, the chances for confounding events are limited.
3.3.3 Liquidity
Tick data is not available for many targets from 1995 to 2011; hence, we con-
struct measures based on daily closing prices from t = −250 to t = 10. We
estimate the eﬀective bid-ask spread based on the covariance of subsequent
changes in closing prices (SPREAD) and the proportion of days per month with
zero returns (ZERO) as deﬁned in Roll [1984] and in Lesmond et al. [1999],
respectively.35 To assess the liquidity of the market for corporate control, we
follow Shleifer and Vishny [1992], among others, and determine the monthly
M&A volume in an industry (MKT_VOL). Moreover, we compute the num-
ber of transactions per month and industry (MKT_BIDS ). Industries refer to
2-digit SIC codes of target ﬁrms, which is in line with Schlingemann et al. [2002].
We also consider a set of variables that capture a target's distress and ne-
gotiation power, which is particularly relevant when liquidity is low. In this
34 Hence, we compute: (bid per target share / target share at t = 5) - (S&P500 at t = 0 /
S&P500 at t = 5) ·100.
35 Alternatively, impact measures infer stock liquidity from the price impact of trading
volume [Amihud, 2002, Kyle, 1985]. The main shortcoming of impact measures is, however,
that they are backward looking, which limits their use in assessing liquidity.
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line of argument, targets with high leverage, high dependency on short-term
ﬁnance, low cash holding and high short-term liquidity needs are more likely to
accept negative premiums or VLPs. To measure the target's ﬁnancial health,
we compute total debt to equity (LEVERAGE), the ratio of short-term debt to
long-term debt (SHORT_DEBT), cash holding deﬁned as cash and cash equiv-
alents to total assets (CASH_TA), and working capital relative to total assets
(WC_TA). Furthermore, SDC provides us with the target liabilities assumed
by the acquirer (LIAB) in the transaction, which we normalize with the target's
market value at t = −20. The variable also indicates a need for cash, arguably
due to ﬁnancial distress.
3.3.4 Agency
Discretionary accruals can be regarded as a proxy for managerial discretion,
which is related to agency theory [Sawicki and Shrestha, 2008, Sawicki, 2011].
We decompose accruals into non-discretionary accruals (NDA) and discretionary
accruals (DA) by estimating a modiﬁed Jones model [Kothari et al., 2005]. We
run the following ﬁxed-eﬀects model to determine non-discretionary accruals.
accrualsit = αi + β
1
TAit
+ γ
∆Revit −∆NRit
TAit
+ εit (14)
The residuals of regression (14) are discretionary accruals, whereas the ﬁtted
values refer to non-discretionary accruals. Furthermore, in line with Jensens's
[1986] Free Cash Flow Hypothesis, CASH_TA, ROIC, and CI (as deﬁned
above) can also be interpreted as indicators for agency costs.
3.3.5 Deal-speciﬁc control variables
In line with the literature mentioned in Section 1 we account for several deal-
speciﬁc control variables from SDC, which may be correlated with takeover
premiums. Eckbo [2009] reports that tender oﬀers (TENDER) are related with
lower premiums. As the ﬁrst bid may put a target into play, we control for
pre-emptive bidding with high initial premiums [Fishman, 1988] by including
the total number of bidders (NUMBID) in the takeover process. Analogously,
and based on the converse argument, we control for withdrawn bids, which may
be due to insuﬃciently high premiums. Intuitively, the theoretical explana-
tions for VLPs work best for friendly bids. Hence, we control for hostile bids
(HOSTILE ). Although we exclude reverse mergers (Section 3.1), some (public)
bidders issue more than half of their equity in the process of the takeover. As
25
explained in Section 3.2 the consideration paid by the acquirer is often signiﬁ-
cantly higher than the price received by target shareholders. The acquirer may
issue additional equity for target capital infusions, target liabilities assumed, or
investments into the own or joint entity in support of the merger. Hence, even
when acquirers issue more than half of their post-issuance equity, it is not a
given that they transfer control to the target shareholders. The latter, however,
beneﬁt from these cash injections via hidden earnouts. We therefore include
a dummy for these mergers (NEW_EQ50 ), as indicated in SDC. Horizontal
mergers may diﬀer in terms of potential synergies, but also because both par-
ties may be jointly aﬀected by industry-speciﬁc factors, such as industry debt
overhang or a low liquidity for corporate assets. If the target and the acquirer
are recorded with the same 4-digit SIC code, the merger is classiﬁed as horizontal
(HORIZONTAL).36
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Descriptive ﬁndings
Using our standard premium measure (see section 3.2), we conﬁrm that nega-
tive premiums exist. Table 1 reports the annual frequencies of all non-missing
premiums, VLPs, and negative premiums in our sample.
(Insert Table 1 about here)
Depending on the year, up to 14.1% of all M&As in the sample exhibited a
negative oﬀer premium. In the whole sample period from 1995 to 2011, 8.4% of
the transactions had a negative premium. Although there is a lot of variation
across years (from 1/55=1.8% in 2009 to 11/78=14.1% in 2004) there is not
a single year in the sample without a negative premium. Nearly three quar-
ters of all negative premiums (72.8%) are reported before 2002. This pattern
extends to VLPs, where 69.6% are observed before 2002, which indicates that
the ﬁfth merger wave was generally rich in low premiums, both negative and
non-negative. Given the announcement of negative oﬀer premiums, Table 1
also reports how many post-announcement premiums (PAPs, with a base price
at t = 5) and how many cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) to the target
were negative or non-negative. Over the total sample period, negative and non-
negative market reactions are rather balanced with 85 (77) non-negative and
36In unreported robustness checks we also tested the following control variables from SDC:
cash infusion into the target, bankruptcy of the target, cash earnouts in percent of the bid
price, a dummy for shareholder litigation, termination fees, lockup options, and for collars.
The results reported in this paper remain qualitatively unchanged. As explained in Section
4.1, some of these controls lacked the necessary variation for inclusion in the reference model.
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73 (85) negative PAPs (CARs). Across years, however, the balance between
non-negative and negative cases within PAPs and for CARs changes frequently
and takes on all possible combinations. For example, in 1997 (2000), there
are more negative (non-negative) cases both for PAPs and CARs, but in 1998
(2003, 2004), we observe more non-negative (negative) PAPs and more negative
(non-negative) CARs. This supports our theoretical argumentation that the
two market reaction measurements capture diﬀerent underlying eﬀects.
Figure 1 shows the median premium for all targets using adjusted and unad-
justed premium measures; apparently the diﬀerences are negligible. Moreover,
Figure1 plots the median premium in the case of negative premiums and of the
lowest 10% and 25% of premiums (VLPs) in the respective year. The median
premium of the lowest decile (VLP, p10) is mostly negative. The median pre-
mium of the lowest quartile (VLP, p25) is mostly non-negative, but often close
to zero and in 2002 even negative.
(Insert Figure 1 about here)
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for all explanatory variables. In line
with the literature [e.g., Dong et al., 2006], we winsorized all variables at the 1st
and 99th percentile, which are reported as minimum and maximum values.37
Note that this does not aﬀect the incidence of negative premiums, as the lowest
percentile is negative.
(Insert Table2 about here)
Table 3 reports medians of continuous explanatory variables for the whole
sample and for the two sub-samples of positive and negative premiums. Col-
umn four shows the diﬀerence in medians between the two sub-groups, and
the last column reports p-values based on a nonparametric K-sample test. For
dummy variables, medians are not useful; thus, the table provides means and
t-tests for the variables NUMBID, TENDER, HORIZONTAL, WITHDRAWN,
NEW_EQ50 and HOSTILE.
37 The following three variables from SDC are not included in Table 2 (and also not in our
econometric speciﬁcations). (i) There is no observation in the sample with cash infusions by
the acquirer into the target. (ii) There only exist a few outlier cases of cash earnouts that
are not zero. As they lie above the 99th percentile they are all set to zero after winsorizing.
(iii) The same applies to a dummy variable that indicates whether the target is bankrupt or
goes bankrupt during the transaction. When checking the outliers of cash earnouts and of
the less than one percent bankruptcy cases we ﬁnd that they perfectly predict non-negative
premiums.
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(Insert Table 3 about here)
Although it is too early to draw any conclusions, we ﬁnd that proxies for
the hidden earnout hypothesis exhibit highly signiﬁcant group-wise diﬀerences.
In particular, the equity portion (EQ) of the bid, the portion of new equity
(NEW_EQ), and relative size (RSIZE) are considerably higher in the case of
negative premiums. This is in line with the theoretical considerations. Targets
with low asset turnover (TURNOVER) seem to accept negative premiums more
frequently. Based on a simple two-sample comparison, most proxies for the over-
valuation hypothesis lack discriminatory power, although takeovers with nega-
tive premiums have a higher RUNUP compared to positive premiums, which
may point towards excessive runups as a possible reason for (speculative) over-
valuation. The price-to-residual-income-model-value is signiﬁcantly higher for
negative premiums, but only for bidders (PRIMV_b) and not for targets. Most
measures for market liquidity and for ﬁnancial distress show now signiﬁcant dif-
ferences, with the exception of a signiﬁcantly lower M&A volume (MKT_VOL)
in the case of negative premiums. In line with expectations, if a bidder issues
more than half of its equity in the transaction (NEW_EQ50), if a bid is with-
drawn (WITHDRAWN), and if a bid is not a tender oﬀer (TENDER), negative
premiums are more prevalent.
4.2 Determinants of negative premiums
We use logistic regression models to explain the binary outcome of a neg-
ative or positive oﬀer premium.38 Negative premiums refer to the standard
market-adjusted premium measure with a base price at t = −20 (see Section
3.2), unless explicitly mentioned otherwise. The speciﬁcation of the explanatory
models requires a trade-oﬀ between the importance of the independent variable
(its discriminatory power) and the availability of observations. Including all
variables would result in such a drop of observations that an in depth analy-
sis becomes impossible. We could select variables that discriminate between
negative and positive premiums based on two-sample descriptive statistics (see
Table 3). A more precise approach, however, is to estimate logit models using
each variable as sole explanatory variable. Based on these logit models, receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) curves can be derived. We follow this approach
and use the area under the curve and the number of observations together with
the descriptive statistics to select the most promising explanatory variables for
our reference model. Noteworthy, RUNUP , the equity portion of the bid (EQ),
the issue of new equity (NEW_EQ), the relative size of the target (RSIZE ), and
38Probit speciﬁations provide similar results in terms of the direction of inﬂuence and the
signiﬁcance of coeﬃcients.
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Tobin's Q of the target (TQ_t) exhibit the largest area under the ROC curve
and have at least 1774 observations. Other variables like the price-to-residual-
income-model-value of the bidder (PRIMV_b) have a high discriminatory power
- but lack the number of observations (941) to justify inclusion into the reference
model.39 All model speciﬁcations account for (i) industry-speciﬁc eﬀects by in-
cluding dummies both (a) for the target's and (b) for the bidder's SIC code,
and (ii) possible time related eﬀects with year dummies. All reported stan-
dard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using the Huber-White sandwich
estimator.
4.2.1 Overvaluation
Table 4 focuses on Proposition (1) and (2). Model [A] shows the reference or
base model containing explanatory variables with the highest discriminatory
power and suﬃcient observations. The eﬀects of Tobin's Q (TQ_t and TQ_b)
are in line with Proposition (1). High-Q targets are more likely to receive of-
fers with negative premiums, which suggests that they are overvalued. Bidders'
valuation levels (TQ_b) also support an overvaluation eﬀect as relatively over-
valued targets exhibit negative premiums. The reference model [A] contains
the portion of equity (EQ) and the target's relative size (RSIZE) as additional
control variables due to their high explanatory power. As discussed in more
detail in the next section, both of them provide support for hidden earnouts as
another, mutually not exclusive explanation of negative premiums. All other
control variables show no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects.
Speciﬁcations [B] and [C] introduce alternative overvaluation measurements
as discussed in Section 3.3.1. Although the number of observations declines to
less than half the sample due to missing data, Model [B] shows that overvalued
targets with a high price-to-residual-income-model-value (PRIMV_t) are more
likely to exhibit negative premiums. It thus reconﬁrms the relevance of the
overvaluation hypothesis as stated in Proposition (1).
Model [D] and [E] include target runups to test Proposition (2). Here, we
use a diﬀerent measure of premiums, referring to a base price at t = −1, and not
t = −20, as in our standard models. This ensures that the measurement periods
for runups (t = −20 to t = −1) and for premiums do not overlap. In support of
Proposition (2), Model [D] shows that runups have a positive partial eﬀect on the
likelihood of negative premiums. It is not clear, however, whether runups reﬂect
an overvaluation of the target's fundamental value, or an overestimation of
expected merger gains for the target. To analyze this we include the interaction
term between target runups and Tobin's Q (RUNUPxTQ_t) in Model [E].40 If
39Of course, we include variables with a low number of observations in alternative model
speciﬁcations and robustness checks.
40Note that, both, fundamental overvaluation as well as excessive runups trigger a market
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runups merely reﬂect an increase in Tobin's Q the interaction term would be
positive. However, in support of Proposition (2), which suggests that excessive
runups can also serve as a separate reason for negative premiums, the interaction
term is negative and signiﬁcant.
The explanatory power of all speciﬁcations [A] to [E] is meaningful and
pseudo R-squares range from 0.12 to 0.23. Accordingly, we can summarize that
we ﬁnd empirical support for Proposition (1) and (2).
(Insert Table 4 about here)
4.2.2 Hidden earnout
In the previous section, Table 4 already reported positive eﬀects of the equity
portion of the bid (EQ) and target's relative size (RSIZE ), not only in the
reference Model [A], but also in all other speciﬁcations [B] to [E]. In Table 5,
we provide more detailed tests of Proposition (4) and (5). First, Model [F] and
[G] corroborate the results in Table 4 by showing that the partial eﬀects of EQ
and RSIZE stay positive and statistically signiﬁcant in isolation. Despite the
positive eﬀects of RSIZE the results in [G] could be driven by a group of very
small targets, while our model predicts that relatively large targets should be
associated with negative premiums. To check this we create a variable BIG_t
that dummies the upper quintile of RSIZE . Model [H] conﬁrms that relatively
large targets predict negative premiums, in line with Proposition (5). 41
Based on our theoretical considerations in Section 2.2, Model [I] introduces
the percentage of new equity issues (NEW_EQ), which we ﬁnd to be posi-
tively related to negative premiums as predicted by Proposition (4). Note that
NEW_EQ refers to the number of common shares issued in the transaction
divided by total number of acquirer's outstanding shares. Hence, NEW_EQ
does not include share repurchases by the bidder or non-ﬂoating shares that are
authorized before the transaction. Schlingemann [2004] shows that share issues
and repurchases in the year prior to the takeover are correlated with bidder an-
nouncement returns. This implies that ex ante ﬁnancing may play an important
role that cannot be fully captured with NEW_EQ . Therefore, as an alternative
proxy for the potential ownership of the target shareholders in the merged en-
tity, we compute the relative size of the target multiplied with the stock portion
correction once a negative premium is announced. Therefore, the target shareholder's market
reaction (CAR_t) cannot discriminate between the two types of overvaluation as underlying
reasons for negative premiums.
41This eﬀect is robust when we include BIG_t together with RSIZE (unreported).
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of the consideration. Model [J] includes this variable (EQ_RSIZE), which eﬀec-
tively is the interaction term between EQ and RSIZE , and conﬁrms the results
in [I] as well as Proposition (4).
On a more exploratory note and without an explicit proposition to test,
Model [K] introduces proxies for expected synergies the target's proﬁtability
(ROIC and CI) and asset utilization (TURNOVER). We readily acknowledge
that these proxies are imprecise. Moreover, due to missing values, the number
of observations in speciﬁcation [K] drops to 1117 observations. It is therefore
not surprising that we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀects.
Overall, based on Table 5, the equity portion of the bid, new equity issues
and the target's relative size can explain negative premiums conﬁrming the
hidden earnout hypothesis, as stated in Proposition (4) and (5).
(Insert Table 5 about here)
4.2.3 Liquidity and agency
Table 6 reports tests of Proposition (7) on the eﬀects of liquidity and explores
the role of agency. As in previous speciﬁcations, and in spite of diﬀerent sample
sizes, the equity portion (EQ) and relative size (RSIZE ) are signiﬁcant in all
speciﬁcations, reconﬁrming the hidden earnout hypotheses. In addition, Tobin's
Q (TQ_t and TQ_b) has predictive power in models [L] to [P], in support of
the overvaluation hypothesis. Model [L] introduces measures for stock liquidity
(SPREAD and ZERO), which do not have any signiﬁcant eﬀect. Model [M]
includes proxies for liquidity in the market of corporate control: the number
(MKT_BIDS) and volume (MKT_VOL) of monthly M&A bids. The number of
bids do not seem to play a role, but targets in industries with a low M&A volume
are more likely to face negative premiums. This provides limited support for
Proposition (7), which also states that target shareholders anticipate suﬃciently
low non-takeover values for the target, as in situations of ﬁnancial distress. Yet,
the empirical models in [N] and [O] do not support this view, for ﬁrms with low
leverage (LEVERAGE), high cash holding (CASH_TA) and, in [N], low net
working capital (WC_TA) are more likely to exhibit negative premiums.42
42SDC also provides a dummy that indicates when the target company is bankrupt or goes
bankrupt during the transaction and the amount of capital infusion into the target during
the transaction (normalized over the target's market value at t = −20). Both variables
are dropped from the estimation because they perfectly predict positive premiums, which is
in conﬂict with Proposition (7). We also computed Altman's Z [Altman et al., 1977] and
Ohlson's O [Ohlson, 1980] as additional measures for ﬁnancial distress. Due to the high data
requirements both measures reduced the number of observations considerably. As with the all
other proxies for distress, we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant relation between either Altman's
Z or Ohlson's O and negative premiums or VLPs.
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Models [P] and [Q] consider agency proxies. As discussed in Section 2.4, man-
agers would violate target shareholders' participation constraint if they support
negative premiums purely based on self-serving motives. Accordingly, in [P], we
do no ﬁnd any eﬀect on negative premiums. However, in the domain of positive
premiums agency costs may be a motive for VLPs. In Model [Q], we therefore
use a dummy for positive VLPs and exclude all negative premiums from the
estimation. The agency proxies, however, still lack any predictive power.43
Overall, liquidity seems to play a minor role in explaining negative premiums
with only market transaction volume showing a signiﬁcant result. Coupled with
the fact that ﬁnancial distress has no predictive power, Proposition (7) cannot
be conﬁrmed. This also applies to agency costs, which ﬁnd no support as an
alternative explanation for negative premiums.
(Insert Table 6 about here)
4.3 Market reaction to negative premiums
If our theoretical considerations are consistent, we should observe certain,
discriminating market reactions after a negative premium is announced. The
sequence of the initial bid and subsequent market response leads to a sequential
logistic analysis. Following the methodology discussed by Amemiya [1985] and
Liao [1994], we specify a sequential logistic model that assesses two steps: ﬁrst,
whether a premium is positive or negative; second, given the announcement of
negative premiums, how a market incorporates this event in target prices.44 The
logistic models presented thus far addressed the ﬁrst step, isolating overvaluation
and hidden earnouts as the most important explanations for negative premiums.
For the second step, we therefore focus on these two explanations as they also
provide us with theoretical predictions on discriminating stock market reactions
to negative premiums.
The second stage is not only a direct test of Proposition (3) and (6) on
market reactions, but also allows us to further discriminate between the two
43This also does not change if we dummy the lowest quartile of positive premiums or run
OLS regressions (speciﬁed as in [Q]) on all positive premiums as a continuous variable (unre-
ported). In the latter case, the discretionary accruals of the bidder (DA_b) have a positive
and signiﬁcant (β =17.724, p =0.045) eﬀect on premiums. This may point to agency costs for
bidder shareholders, but fails to explain negative premiums or VLPs.
44 Besides a sequential logistic model, one could consider a nested logistic (or multinominal)
model [Nagakura and Kobayashi, 2007]. A nested model, however, would assume that all
choices (positive and negative premiums, as well as positive and negative market reactions)
are selected simultaneously. This is not the case. In fact, we need to acknowledge a time gap
to capture the market response after the announcement of a negative premium.
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theoretical approaches, which is diﬃcult in the ﬁrst stage of the model, because
some variables can be interpreted as proxies for both theories. For example, the
valuation level of the acquirer could be used to test the hidden earnout hypothe-
sis, as a high valuation level could signal substantial future growth expectations
and thus considerable synergies. The valuation level of the acquirer could, how-
ever, also serve as a test for the overvaluation hypothesis, as shareholders of an
overvalued target may be more likely to accept negative premiums if they are
compensated in value stocks as opposed to even more overvalued bidder stock.
The second stage model allows us to diﬀerentiate between these two arguments.
4.3.1 Overvaluation
As stated in Proposition (6), we expect negative target abnormal announcement
returns to negative premiums if they are due to overvaluation. As only the sign
but not the magnitude of this reaction matters to identify overvaluation, we
compute a dummy variable that distinguishes between a negative abnormal
return (1 if CAR_t< 0) and a non-negative return (0 if CAR_t≥ 0). With
this variable as the dependent, we estimate logistic models with the sample of
deals that have negative premiums. Hence, a positive coeﬃcient indicates that
a negative market reaction on negative premiums is more likely.
Table 7 reports the results of this second step of the sequential logistic model,
complementing our estimations of the determinants of negative premiums in the
ﬁrst step. Speciﬁcation [R] replicates the reference Model [A] in Table 4. As
in Model [A], and in line with Proposition (3), TQ_t in [R] positively predicts
negative market corrections to negative premiums, which points towards target
overvaluation as underlying reason. Also, in correspondence with [A], the sign
of TQ_b is as expected in all speciﬁcations of Table 7 and signiﬁcant in [T]
and [V].45 In contrast to Model [A] of the ﬁrst step, none of the proxies for
hidden earnouts (EQ , RSIZE ) are signiﬁcant in the second step. As explained
in Section 2.2, this is in line with our expectations, because of a bias against
positive abnormal returns to hidden earnouts when targets are overvalued. In
fact, the insigniﬁcance of proxies for hidden earnouts supports our notion that
negative premiums with a negative abnormal return are due to overvaluation.
Models [S] and [T] analyze target runups, which clearly conﬁrm Proposition
(3), but also the eﬀects found in the corresponding estimations [D] and [E].
Runups not only predict negative premiums (Table 4), but also a downward
market correction (Table 7). In combination, we can infer from [D] and [E] in
the ﬁrst step, and from [S] and [T] in the second step, that runups are neither a
mere symptom of expected hidden earnouts ([D],[S]) nor of fundamental over-
valuation ([E],[T]), but that excessive runups themselves constitute one of the
45Due to the low number of observations in the second step, we also report and interpret a
statistical signiﬁcance at p<.1.
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reasons for negative premiums. Model [U] shows that the eﬀect of runups is also
robust to the inclusion of the market reaction to the bidder. A higher likelihood
for a negative CAR_t is associated with a lower CAR_b, which shows that
bidder shareholders are skeptic about deals where target overvaluation may be
the reason for negative premiums. Model [V] tests liquidity as a competing
explanation, but without support.
Overall, we can conﬁrm Proposition (3) not only with regard to the over-
valuation of the target's fundamental value (TQ_t), but also with regard to
excessive runups (RUNUP).
(Insert Table 7 about here)
4.3.2 Hidden earnout
As explained in Section 2.2, the market response to negative premiums with
hidden earnouts is measured best with post-announcement premiums (PAPs).
Negative premiums remain negative after their announcement (with a PAP base
price at t = 5), if the anticipation of hidden earnouts prevents that target price
adjustments hit or undercut the bid price.46 To analyze the second step of
the sequential logistic model for hidden earnouts, and to test Proposition (6),
we use a dependent variable that takes the value one for negative PAPs and
zero otherwise. The estimation procedure corresponds to the previous section.
Model [W] in Table 8 is the reference model. The other model speciﬁcations
probe into alternative proxies for hidden earnouts ([X] to [Z]) plus runups and
market liquidity as competing explanations for negative PAPs ([ZA][ZB]).
With regard to hidden earnouts, we ﬁnd that relative size (RSIZE ), big
targets in the upper quintile of RSIZE (BIG_t), and the product of EQ and
RSIZE (EQ_RSIZE ) as a proxy for ownership transfer, are all positively cor-
related with negative PAPs ([W] to [Y]). Model [Z] provides robustness to the
inclusion of abnormal returns (CAR_t , CAR_b) and shows that the sharehold-
ers of both target and bidder react positively to the announcement of negative
premiums when they expect hidden earnouts. This conﬁrms Proposition (6) and
corresponds to our ﬁndings in the ﬁrst stage (Table 5). There is, however, one
striking exception. Although the equity portion of the bid (EQ) is a strong and
consistent predictor of negative premiums (Tables 4, 5 and 6), it fails to discrim-
inate between hidden earnouts and overvaluation as underlying eﬀects (Tables
7 and 8). Previous studies show that higher target valuations are associated
46 In fact, as shown further below, the average target return (CAR_t) is positive, when
premiums stay negative after their announcement. This indicates that PAPs successfully
identify hidden earnouts as discrete eﬀects and separate from overvalution.
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with a higher likelihood for all-equity bids and with lower bid premiums [Dong
et al., 2006, Betton et al., 2008a]. Our results are in line with these ﬁndings.
If equity bids are more likely for deals with high target (mis)valuations as well
as high hidden earnouts, the equity portion cannot distinguish between the two
underlying reasons for negative premiums.
With regard to the proxies for overvaluation, neither higher target valuations
(TQ_t) nor excessive runups (RUNUP) predict negative PAPs in Table 8. In
fact, a direct comparison with Table 7 shows that all coeﬃcients of TQ_t ,
TQ_b and CAR_b point into the opposite direction. The positive eﬀects of
TQ_b, CAR_b, CAR_t , and HORIZONTAL suggest that high-Q bidders and
horizontal mergers have a higher synergies potential. Finally, we also probe into
market liquidity as a possible reason for negative premiums. We ﬁnd that stock
market liquidity has no eﬀects (unreported), but that targets in industries with
high monthly transaction volumes are less likely to experience market reactions
that are consistent with hidden earnouts (negative PAPs).
Overall we can conﬁrm Proposition (6) and indirectly reconﬁrm Proposition
(3) if we exclude the equity portion of the bid as a discriminating proxy.
(Insert Table 8 about here)
5 VLPs
As explained in Section 2.5, the mechanisms behind negative premiums ex-
plain VLPs in general, including non-negative premiums. To test this, we rerun
the estimations in Tables 4, 5, and 6 with dummies for VLPs, deﬁned as the low-
est decile of all premiums, as dependent variable (see corresponding Tables 12, 13
and 14 in appendix). Table 9 reports the most important results, which conﬁrm
that our previous ﬁndings on the determinants of negative premiums also ap-
ply to VLPs. In fact, the proxies for hidden earnouts (RSIZE , EQ , NEW_EQ ,
EQ_RSIZE ), overvaluation (TQ_t , PRIMV_t , RUNUP , RUNUPxTQ_t) and
for liquidity in the market for corporate control (MKT_VOL) are equally or even
more statistically signiﬁcant for VLPs than for negative premiums. We also ﬁnd,
in line with our previous results, that all proxies for alternative explanations of
VLPs are either statistically insigniﬁcant or provide conﬂicting evidence (see
appendix).
(Insert Table 9 about here)
Generally, a single cut-oﬀ point that deﬁnes VLPs is more sensitive to mea-
surement problems than the whole distribution of takeover premiums. We there-
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fore also analyze the whole spectrum of premiums, and of possible VLP deﬁ-
nitions, with quantile regressions (least-absolute value models). Compared to
standard OLS regressions, quantile regressions are more robust in the presence
of outliers. This is an important advantage as takeover premiums exhibit many
outliers and are not normally distributed: the lowest quartile is characterized by
premiums close to zero (Figure 1), whereas the 90th, 95th and 99th percentiles
show premiums of over 93, 118, and 213 percent, respectively.47 Hence, focusing
on diﬀerent quantiles is more insightful than analyzing the mean.
We run quantile regressions of the models [A],[E],[H],[I],[J], and [M] for every
decile of the distribution of premiums and extract the partial eﬀects of selected
covariates. Table 10 reports the coeﬃcients and bootstrapped standard errors
of the main explanatory variables. All of these variables signiﬁcantly aﬀect
premiums below the 50th percentile, which provides substantial evidence that
the determinants of negative premiums (in logistic regressions) translate to a
substantial portion of non-negative premiums below the median (in quantile
regressions).48
(Insert Table 10 about here)
Although some of the variables signaling overvaluation (TQ_t , RUNUP)
and hidden earnouts (RSIZE , BIG_t) predict lower premiums across almost
all percentiles, they mainly aﬀect the lower half of premiums. Figure 2 shows
the median of TQ_t and RSIZE for diﬀerent premium deciles. It is apparent
that the valuation level and the relative size of the target decline from lower to
higher premiums, which suggests that both variables are more relevant for lower
premiums. The missing signiﬁcance of RUNUPxTQ_t above Q50 in Table 10
indicates that runups coincide with and reﬂect high target valuations in the
upper half or premiums. Hence, excessive runups, as an independent factor,
only predict lower values for premiums below the median (≤Q50). Hidden
earnouts crucially depend on payment in bidder's stock (EQ) and the partial
transfer of ownership to the target (NEW_EQ , EQ_RSIZE ). In Table 10, all
of these proxies only aﬀect premiums below the median. The latter also applies
to MKT_VOL, which is the only (weakly) signiﬁcant market liquidity variable.
Overall, the results emphasize that the proposed mechanisms behind negative
premiums not only apply to VLPs, but to most premiums below the median.
47All of the following tests reject the Null that premiums are normally distributed (at
a 99.999% level of conﬁdence): Kolmogorov-Smirnov for equality to normal distributions,
Skewness and kurtosis test for normality, Shapiro-Wilk test for normality, and Shapiro-Francia
tests for normality.
48Note that the coeﬃcients have the opposite sign to the logistic regressions above, because
the dependent does not dummy very low (or negative) premiums, but reﬂects the (continuous)
percentile in the premium distribution. Also note that MKT_VOL is the only variable where
we expect a positive relation (more market liquidity, higher premiums).
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(Insert Figure 2 about here)
6 Alternative measures of negative premiums
As discussed in Section 3.2, there are diﬀerent ways to measure premiums
depending on the base price and market adjustments. To check whether our
main results hold for diﬀerent premium measures, Table 11 reports the reference
model described in Model [A] using six alternative premium measures.49 Model
[R1] refers to our standard measure, but excludes slightly negative premiums,
which may be noise, by coding negative premiums that are smaller than -5% with
a dummy equal to one, else zero. Model [R2] refers to our standard measure,
but without adjusting for changes in the S&P 500 index. Model [R3] and [R4]
compute index-adjusted premiums with a base price at t = −5 and t = −1,
respectively.50 Speciﬁcation [R5] refers to the average of the index-adjusted
target share prices at t = −20, t = −5, and t = −1. Finally, Model [R6]
shows the results of the reference model with an index-adjusted base price at
t = −40. Regardless which premium measure is used the equity portion of the
bid (EQ) and Tobin's Q of the target (TQ_t) exhibit consistent results. TQ_b
and RSIZE are also consistent except in Model [R6], where RSIZE just misses
the 95% level of conﬁdence (p < 0.062).
Hence, overall, and also in the light of the quantile regressions of our stan-
dard premium measure (Section 5), the main results of this paper with regard
to overvaluation and hidden earnouts are robust to most negative premium
measures and cut-oﬀ points for VLPs.
(Insert Table 11 about here)
7 Conclusion
Prior empirical research tends to truncate or remove negative premiums and
regards them as noise in the data. We show that negative premiums exist in the
period from 1995 to 2011, and that they account for 8.4% of all premiums. Our
49 Our standard premium measure uses a target share price 20 trading days prior to the
announcement (t = −20), corrected for stock market movements using the S&P 500 index
(see Section 3.2).
50 The measure in [R3] is also applied to test Proposition (2) in Model [D] and [E], as it
does not overlap with the runup period ranging from t = −20 to t = −1.
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paper develops three theoretical explanations for negative premiums: overvalua-
tion, hidden earnouts and market liquidity. For each of these approaches, formal
propositions are derived and empirically tested. Negative premiums, however,
are just the most extreme and salient tip of the iceberg of low premiums. In
fact, we show that the explanations for negative premiums also apply to the
majority of non-negative premiums below the median.
Proposition (1) focuses on stand-alone overvaluation, and logistic models
conﬁrm that targets with a high Tobin's Q and (to a lesser extent) a high price-
to-residual-income-model-value explain negative premiums (Table 4) and VLPs
(Table 9). Alternative proxies for overvaluation possess less explanatory power,
arguably due to the limited number of observations (Table 4). Quantile regres-
sions show that target overvaluation negatively aﬀects premiums across most
of the distribution up to the 90th percentile (Table 10). However, the extent
of target overvaluation is highest for lower percentiles (Figure 2). Proposition
(2) states that excessive runups constitute a form of speculative overvaluation
that can lead to negative premiums. The empirical results indeed show that
the likelihood of negative premiums (Table 4) and VLPs (Table 9) increases in
the runup. Although we ﬁnd evidence for the substitution hypothesis across
all premium percentiles (Table 10), excessive runups, as an independent factor,
only predict lower values for premiums below the median. In sequential logistic
models, we conﬁrm that the market reacts to negative premiums for overvalued
targets with negative abnormal announcement returns (Proposition (3), Table
7).
Proposition (4) and (5) contend that hidden earnouts explain negative premi-
ums. Our empirical tests provide strong evidence in favor of the hidden earnout
hypothesis. In particular, relative size, the equity portion of the bid, and proxies
for new equity issues predict negative premiums (Table 5) and VLPs (Table 9).
Quantile regressions (Table 10 and Figure 2) underline that the hidden earnout
hypothesis also applies to lower, non-negative premiums (40th percentile and
below). Sequential logistic regressions conﬁrm a positive market reaction to the
announcement of negative premiums with hidden earnouts, which results in a
negative post-announcement premium (Proposition (6), Table 8).
Proposition (7) explores the role of liquidity in the stock market and the
market for corporate control. We ﬁnd no support for stock market liquidity
and only statistically weak support for the relevance of transaction volumes for
negative premiums (Table 6), VLPs (Table 9) and higher premium percentiles
(Table 10). Related factors pertaining to ﬁre sales and a target's ﬁnancial health
lack explanatory power. We also rule out agency costs as a possible reason for
negative premiums.
In conclusion, the paper provides empirical evidence that negative premiums
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do exist and proposes theoretical explanations, which are tested and largely
conﬁrmed. Furthermore, we show that the theoretical explanations are not only
relevant for negative premiums, but also apply to the lowest four deciles of all
premiums and thus to a signiﬁcant proportion of the takeover market.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Frequency of VLPs and negative premiums
Year Total VLP
Negative oﬀer premium
NEG PAP pos PAP neg CAR pos CAR neg
1995 115 10 8 2 6 2 6
1996 143 16 15 10 5 7 8
1997 191 25 22 10 12 7 15
1998 217 24 21 14 7 9 12
1999 224 20 14 8 5 7 7
2000 209 22 21 12 8 14 7
2001 131 18 17 8 8 10 7
2002 64 11 9 7 1 4 5
2003 81 8 5 1 4 3 2
2004 78 12 11 5 6 5 6
2005 83 8 5 2 3 1 4
2006 86 4 2 1 1 2 0
2007 98 5 4 2 2 2 2
2008 73 4 4 2 2 2 2
2009 55 2 1 1 0 0 1
2010 66 2 2 0 2 1 1
2011 23 3 1 0 1 1 0
Total 1937 194 162 85 73 77 85
Note: Total contains all non-missing oﬀer premiums in SDC with a base price at t = −20.
VLP refers to the lowest decile of all premiums. NEG reports all Negative oﬀer premiums
according to the standard deﬁnition with a base price at t = −20. PAP pos (PAP neg) refers
to a non-negative (negative) post-announcement premium with a base price at t = 5, given
NEG. (Four deals have missing base prices at t = 5, resulting in 85+73=158
post-announcement premiums.) CAR pos (CAR neg) refers to a non-negative (negative)
cumulative abnormal return to the target from t = −1 to t = 1, given NEG.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max
PREMIUM 1776 43.229 39.969 -45.529 18.923 36.106 60.943 213.338
RUNUP 1774 0.084 0.200 -0.380 -0.029 0.052 0.167 0.853
CAR_t 1755 0.224 0.252 -0.259 0.060 0.180 0.333 1.245
CAR_b 1768 -0.018 0.083 -0.281 -0.055 -0.010 0.022 0.259
TQ_t 1776 2.469 2.635 0.537 1.217 1.652 2.541 18.457
TQ_b 1776 3.221 3.815 0.740 1.453 2.065 3.199 27.046
PRIMV t 1135 4.999 16.433 -8.818 -0.012 0.241 2.386 108.963
PRIMV b 941 12.823 57.081 -1.700 0.021 0.288 2.094 482.465
ACCR_t 1187 -0.197 0.295 -1.489 -0.286 -0.103 -0.035 0.434
ACCR_b 939 -0.151 0.176 -0.969 -0.206 -0.089 -0.042 0.118
NOA_t 1310 0.632 0.238 -0.475 0.554 0.692 0.788 0.930
NOA_b 955 0.650 0.159 0.023 0.575 0.681 0.760 0.908
NDA_t 1224 -0.350 0.074 -0.620 -0.378 -0.343 -0.324 -0.092
NDA_b 948 -0.351 0.042 -0.543 -0.362 -0.342 -0.328 -0.229
DA_t 1186 0.156 0.295 -1.040 0.047 0.242 0.317 0.747
DA_b 939 0.198 0.186 -0.611 0.137 0.252 0.309 0.557
EQ 1776 54.229 46.895 0.000 0.000 73.607 100.000 100.000
NEW_EQ 1776 14.174 17.978 0.000 0.000 5.259 26.049 70.744
RSIZE 1776 0.295 0.439 0.001 0.036 0.133 0.381 2.990
ZERO 1501 0.136 0.101 0.023 0.062 0.108 0.181 0.612
SPREAD 1501 1.506 1.955 0.000 0.000 0.845 2.390 9.486
MKT_BIDS 1767 32.420 38.031 1.000 8.000 15.000 33.000 156.000
MKT_VOL 1767 3.754 7.184 0.000 0.466 1.343 3.606 44.341
LEVERAGE 1401 0.540 1.167 -1.710 0.058 0.247 0.604 8.662
SHORT_DEBT 1232 0.358 0.347 0.000 0.052 0.227 0.636 1.000
CASH_TA 1755 0.227 0.237 0.001 0.031 0.133 0.372 0.884
WC_TA 1529 0.313 0.272 -0.582 0.113 0.304 0.521 0.869
ROIC 1146 -0.672 6.004 -30.349 -0.509 0.224 0.878 18.673
TURNOVER 1276 1.054 0.733 0.013 0.544 0.928 1.369 4.086
CI 1243 1.119 1.346 0.280 0.719 0.860 1.029 12.550
LIAB 1776 0.139 0.410 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.475
NUMBID 1776 0.037 0.188 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
TENDER 1776 0.209 0.407 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
HORIZONTAL 1776 0.380 0.485 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
WITHDRAWN 1776 0.128 0.335 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
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N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max
NEW_EQ50 1776 0.025 0.157 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
HOSTILE 1776 0.022 0.147 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Note: The source of the data is SDC and Datastream. Variable names with the ending _t
(_b) refer to the target (bidder). The merger announcement date is t = 0. PREMIUM is
(bid per share / target share price at t = −20) - (S&P500 at t = 0 / S&P500 at t = −20)
·100. RUNUP is the market adjusted buy and hold return to the target from t = −20 to
t = −1. CAR_t (CAR_b) is the market adjusted cumulative abnormal return from t = −1
to t = 1. TQ_t (TQ_b) is Tobin's Q deﬁned as market value over book value of assets at
t = −20 (as in Masulis et al. [2007]). PRIMV_t (PRIMV_b) is the
price-to-residual-income-model-value as in Dong et al. [2006] and Ohlson [1995]. ACCR_t
(ACCR_b) and NOA_t (NOA_b) is operating accruals and net operating assets,
respectively, as deﬁned in Hirshleifer et al. [2004, p.306-307]. NDA_t (NDA_b) and DA_t
(DA_b) is non-discretionary and discretionary accruals, respectively, estimated with the
modiﬁed Jones model. EQ is the percentage of equity in the consideration. NEW_EQ is
the number of common shares issued in the transaction divided by the total number of
acquirer's outstanding shares (after issuance). RSIZE is the ratio of the target over bidder
market capitalization at t = −20. ZERO is the proportion of days with zero returns per
month as in Lesmond et al. [1999]. SPREAD is the estimated bid-ask-spread based on the
covariance of subsequent changes in closing prices as in Roll [1984]. MKT_BIDS and
MKT_VOL is the monthly frequency and US$ volume, respectively, of all domestic US
M&As in the 2-digit SIC target industry. LEVERAGE is total debt to equity,
SHORT_DEBT is short-term over long-term debt, CASH_TA is cash and cash equivalents
over total assets, and WC_TA is working capital divided by total assets. ROIC is earnings
before interest and taxes over ﬁxed assets, TURNOVER is revenues over ﬁxed assets, and
CI is operating costs over revenues. LIAB is the amount of target liabilities assumed buy
the acquirer in the transaction. NUMBID is a dummy for more than one bidder in the
takeover. TENDER is a dummy for tender oﬀers. HORIZONTAL is a dummy for mergers
in the same 4-digit SIC industry. WITHDRAWN is a dummy for withdrawn oﬀers.
NEW_EQ50 is a dummy for acquirers that issue more than half of the post-issuance equity.
HOSTILE is a dummy for mergers that SDC classiﬁes as hostile.
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Table 3: Comparison of sub-groups with positive or negative premiums
All Positive Negative Diﬀerence P-value
PREMIUM 36.106 39.579 -8.562 48.141 0.000
RUNUP 0.052 0.050 0.080 0.030 0.086
CAR_t 0.180 0.194 -0.009 0.203 0.000
CAR_b -0.010 -0.010 -0.018 0.008 0.130
TQ_t 1.652 1.648 1.764 -0.116 0.291
TQ_b 2.065 2.077 1.874 0.203 0.159
PRIMV_t 0.241 0.231 0.538 -0.307 0.153
PRIMV_b 0.288 0.233 1.728 -1.494 0.000
ACCR_t -0.103 -0.104 -0.091 -0.012 0.742
ACCR_b -0.089 -0.088 -0.101 0.013 0.300
NOA_t 0.692 0.690 0.713 -0.023 0.263
NOA_b 0.681 0.682 0.658 0.024 0.252
NDA_t -0.343 -0.343 -0.348 0.005 0.341
NDA_b -0.342 -0.342 -0.341 -0.001 0.355
DA_t 0.242 0.242 0.258 -0.016 0.454
DA_b 0.252 0.253 0.248 0.005 0.735
EQ 73.607 60.670 99.991 -39.322 0.000
NEW_EQ 5.259 4.002 21.450 -17.448 0.000
RSIZE 0.133 0.119 0.355 -0.235 0.000
ZERO 0.108 0.108 0.115 -0.008 0.214
SPREAD 0.845 0.853 0.782 0.072 0.765
MKT_BIDS 15.000 16.000 15.000 1.000 0.300
MKT_VOL 1.343 1.395 0.925 0.470 0.035
LEVERAGE 0.247 0.249 0.209 0.041 0.431
SHORT_DEBT 0.227 0.218 0.349 -0.131 0.053
CASH_TA 0.133 0.133 0.127 0.006 0.730
WC_TA 0.304 0.306 0.251 0.055 0.387
ROIC 0.224 0.230 0.161 0.070 0.205
TURNOVER 0.928 0.946 0.770 0.176 0.024
CI 0.860 0.860 0.859 0.001 0.919
LIAB 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.112
NUMBID 0.037 0.035 0.050 -0.015 0.379
TENDER 0.209 0.221 0.079 0.142 0.000
HORIZONTAL 0.380 0.377 0.414 -0.038 0.377
WITHDRAWN 0.128 0.122 0.200 -0.078 0.008
NEW_EQ50 0.025 0.020 0.086 -0.066 0.000
HOSTILE 0.022 0.023 0.014 0.008 0.519
Note: The ﬁrst three columns report medians for continuous variables and means for
dummies (NUMBID, TENDER, HORIZONTAL, WITHDRAWN, NEW_EQ50,
HOSTILE) for the total sample, and for two sub-groups with a non-negative or negative
PREMIUM (t = −20). For RUNUP (t = −20 to t = −1), PREMIUM with a base price at
t = −1 is used to deﬁne the two sub-groups to prevent measurement overlaps. P-value refers
to the p-value (Pearson's chi-squared) of a two-sided Student's t-test (nonparametric
K-sample test) for the equality of means (medians) of dummy (continuous) variables. See
notes of Table 2 for the deﬁnition of variables.
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Table 4: Overvaluation and runups (Propositions 1 and 2)
[A] [B] [C] [D] [E]
TQ_t 0.132∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.032) (0.035)
TQ_b -0.122∗∗ -0.075∗ -0.068∗
(0.037) (0.035) (0.034)
PRIMV_t 0.017∗
(0.007)
PRIMV_b 0.000
(0.002)
ACCR_t 0.719
(0.627)
ACCR_b 0.181
(1.164)
NOA_t -0.464
(0.880)
NOA_b -0.416
(0.950)
RUNUP 1.691∗∗∗ 2.830∗∗∗
(0.476) (0.593)
RUNUPxTQ_t -0.333∗∗
(0.103)
EQ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.013∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.008∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
RSIZE 0.629∗∗∗ 1.000∗∗ 0.929∗∗ 0.589∗∗ 0.601∗∗
(0.170) (0.376) (0.323) (0.187) (0.192)
NUMBID 0.443 -0.840 -0.832 0.401 0.426
(0.439) (0.973) (1.239) (0.517) (0.523)
TENDER -0.391 -0.863 -0.233 -0.454 -0.506
(0.363) (0.771) (0.611) (0.323) (0.324)
HORIZONTAL 0.113 -0.153 -0.102 -0.039 -0.026
(0.196) (0.357) (0.367) (0.189) (0.190)
WITHDRAWN 0.275 0.343 0.091 -0.193 -0.217
(0.258) (0.453) (0.416) (0.304) (0.309)
NEW_EQ50 0.633 0.545 0.935 0.342 0.346
(0.454) (0.757) (0.708) (0.489) (0.500)
HOSTILE -0.226 -0.789 -0.714
(0.849) (1.106) (1.109)
pseudo R2 0.13 0.23 0.20 0.12 0.13
ll -425.881 -138.404 -156.995 -448.942 -443.468
aic 929.762 346.808 387.991 977.884 968.937
bic 1143.565 498.410 550.118 1197.124 1193.657
N 1776 562 591 1774 1774
∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: All models refer to logistic regressions with a dummy for negative premiums as dependent.
The base date for the premiums in [D]-[E] is t = −1 to prevent overlap with runups (t = −20
to t = −1). [A]-[C] test Proposition 1 and [D]-[E] Proposition 2. In [B] and [C] HOSTILE is
dropped as it predicts positive premiums perfectly. All models include ﬁxed eﬀects for year, target
SIC and bidder SIC (unreported). Reported standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for
heteroskedasticity. RUNUPxTQ_t is the product of RUNUP and TQ_t . See notes of
Table 2 for the deﬁnition of other variables.
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Table 5: Hidden earnouts (Propositions 4 and 5)
[F] [G] [H] [I] [J] [K]
TQ_t 0.135∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.070
(0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.042)
TQ_b -0.137∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗ -0.108∗∗ -0.120∗∗ -0.120∗∗ -0.143∗
(0.041) (0.035) (0.034) (0.037) (0.037) (0.057)
EQ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.007∗ 0.008∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
RSIZE 0.662∗∗∗ -0.131 0.245
(0.173) (0.439) (0.297)
BIG_t 0.820∗∗∗
(0.211)
NEW_EQ 0.013∗
(0.005)
EQ_RSIZE 0.010∗
(0.005)
ROIC -0.017
(0.021)
TURNOVER -0.082
(0.228)
CI 0.028
(0.088)
NUMBID 0.416 0.491 0.426 0.417 0.420 0.172
(0.448) (0.433) (0.422) (0.434) (0.441) (0.597)
TENDER -0.430 -1.046∗∗ -0.974∗∗ -0.881∗∗ -0.434 -0.417
(0.358) (0.329) (0.328) (0.340) (0.358) (0.431)
HORIZONTAL 0.090 0.110 0.062 0.074 0.124 0.345
(0.195) (0.195) (0.194) (0.194) (0.198) (0.273)
WITHDRAWN 0.482 0.268 0.325 0.399 0.274 0.394
(0.246) (0.262) (0.245) (0.249) (0.263) (0.354)
NEW_EQ50 1.294∗∗∗ 0.759 0.982∗ 1.037∗ 0.472 0.936
(0.385) (0.473) (0.399) (0.431) (0.482) (0.730)
HOSTILE -0.219 -0.345 -0.494 -0.314 -0.142 0.171
(0.849) (0.834) (0.817) (0.834) (0.865) (0.882)
pseudo R2 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.13
ll -430.582 -432.608 -431.242 -435.216 -423.929 -251.258
aic 937.164 941.215 938.483 946.433 927.858 542.516
bic 1145.484 1149.536 1146.804 1154.753 1147.142 642.884
N 1776 1776 1776 1776 1776 1117
∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: All models refer to logistic regressions with a dummy for negative premiums as dependent.
[F][I][J] test Proposition 4 and [G]-[H] Proposition 5. [K] explores the role of expected synergies.
All models include ﬁxed eﬀects for year, target SIC, and bidder SIC (unreported). Reported
standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity. BIG_t is a dummy for the
upper quintile of RSIZE . EQ_RSIZE is the interaction of EQ and RSIZE . See notes of Table 2
for the deﬁnition of other variables.
50
Table 6: Liquidity (Proposition 7) and agency
[L] [M] [N] [O] [P] [Q]
TQ_t 0.124∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.085∗ 0.083∗ 0.130∗ 0.106
(0.036) (0.031) (0.036) (0.035) (0.053) (0.063)
TQ_b -0.125∗∗ -0.094∗ -0.103∗∗ -0.108∗∗ -0.119∗ -0.052
(0.041) (0.039) (0.035) (0.036) (0.050) (0.064)
EQ 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.011∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
RSIZE 0.620∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗ 0.627∗ 0.609∗∗ 0.848∗ 0.980∗
(0.233) (0.178) (0.251) (0.235) (0.331) (0.422)
ZERO 0.944
(1.132)
SPREAD 0.079
(0.057)
MKT_BIDS -0.004
(0.005)
MKT_VOL -0.070∗
(0.031)
LEVERAGE -0.297∗ -0.290∗
(0.146) (0.137)
SHORT_DEBT 0.304
(0.398)
CASH_TA 1.526∗ 1.524∗
(0.775) (0.721)
WC_TA -1.324∗ -1.219
(0.672) (0.658)
LIAB -0.002 -0.034
(0.412) (0.371)
NDA_t -1.615 1.165
(2.129) (1.614)
NDA_b -1.335 2.573
(3.857) (3.829)
DA_t 1.009 -0.230
(0.618) (0.438)
DA_b 0.765 0.445
(1.240) (0.897)
NUMBID 0.184 0.511 0.473 0.433 -0.834 -0.884
(0.563) (0.440) (0.597) (0.585) (1.151) (0.888)
TENDER -0.400 -0.426 -0.408 -0.478 -0.248 -0.631
(0.406) (0.373) (0.516) (0.509) (0.612) (0.601)
HORIZONTAL 0.121 0.135 0.171 0.036 -0.212 0.473
(0.234) (0.196) (0.277) (0.266) (0.358) (0.354)
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[L] [M] [N] [O] [P] [Q]
WITHDRAWN 0.335 0.230 0.278 0.225 0.125 1.131∗∗
(0.308) (0.262) (0.363) (0.326) (0.441) (0.428)
NEW_EQ50 0.695 0.597 0.178 0.459 1.035 -0.650
(0.648) (0.483) (0.719) (0.613) (0.746) (1.253)
HOSTILE -0.804 -0.310 -0.395 -0.481 0.171
(1.125) (0.870) (1.160) (1.123) (0.728)
pseudo R2 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.23 0.18
ll -326.225 -416.472 -234.742 -269.306 -151.369 -155.406
aic 732.450 914.944 555.485 624.613 380.737 392.812
bic 944.657 1139.503 767.914 842.981 551.628 569.593
N 1488 1767 1033 1186 591 551
∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Models [L]-[Q] report logistic regressions with a dummy for negative premiums
as dependent. The dependent variable in [Q] is a dummy for positive VLPs (lowest decile).
Models [L]-[P] test Proposition 7. [P][Q] explore the role of agency costs. HOSTILE is dropped
in [P], because it perfectly predicts positive premiums. All models include ﬁxed eﬀects for
year, target SIC, and bidder SIC (unreported). Reported standard errors (in parentheses) are
corrected for heteroskedasticity. See notes of Table 2 for the deﬁnition of variables.
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Table 7: Market reaction and overvaluation (Proposition 3)
[R] [S] [T] [U] [V]
TQ_t 0.195** 0.168+ 0.128+ 0.203* 0.169+
(0.073) (0.087) (0.068) (0.103) (0.103)
TQ_b -0.100 -0.144 -0.201+ -0.226 -0.276*
(0.095) (0.121) (0.118) (0.141) (0.136)
EQ -0.001 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
RSIZE 0.461 0.550 0.511 0.666 0.378
(0.550) (0.649) (0.650) (0.715) (0.660)
RUNUP 7.918*** 11.166*** 10.448*** 11.280***
(1.828) (2.364) (2.211) (2.368)
RUNUPxTQ_t -1.049**
(0.389)
CAR_b -7.081* -7.390*
(3.080) (3.230)
MKT_BIDS 0.022
(0.021)
MKT_VOL 0.053
(0.059)
NUMBID 2.349+ 1.650 2.020 2.259 1.787
(1.213) (1.234) (1.260) (1.612) (1.737)
TENDER 1.662 0.682 0.805 0.996 0.910
(1.413) (1.002) (1.012) (1.081) (1.065)
HORIZONTAL -0.671 -0.694 -0.753 -0.631 -0.871
(0.474) (0.482) (0.512) (0.585) (0.566)
WITHDRAWN -0.455 -0.248 0.029 -0.222 -0.107
(0.797) (0.885) (0.866) (1.105) (1.449)
NEW_EQ50 -0.458 -0.541 -0.482 -0.967 -1.280
(0.918) (1.097) (1.109) (1.396) (1.566)
pseudo R2 0.20 0.32 0.35 0.38 0.40
ll -73.744 -62.918 -59.833 -54.334 -52.595
aic 217.487 197.836 193.666 180.669 181.190
bic 318.912 302.159 300.886 283.059 289.269
N 134 134 134 127 127
+ p < 0.10 , * p < 0.05 , ** p < 0.01 , *** p < 0.001
Note: The table reports the second stage of a sequential model, where the sample consists of
negative premiums. [R]-[V] report logistic regressions with a dummy for a negative CAR_t as
dependent (1 if CAR_t <0; CAR_t from t=-1 to t=+1). Models [R]-[U] test Proposition 3
directly. [V] tests liquidity as a competing explanation. In all models, HOSTILE (dropped)
perfectly predicts a positive CAR_t . All models include ﬁxed eﬀects for year, target SIC,
and bidder SIC (unreported). Reported standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for
heteroskedasticity. RUNUPxTQ_t is the interaction between RUNUP and TQ_t . See
notes of Table 2 for the deﬁnition of other variables.
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Table 8: Market reaction and hidden earnouts (Proposition 6)
[W] [X] [Y] [Z] [ZA] [ZB]
TQ_t -0.181* -0.153* -0.192* -0.151 -0.202* -0.105
(0.080) (0.076) (0.080) (0.097) (0.086) (0.106)
TQ_b 0.261* 0.236* 0.277* 0.307* 0.257+ 0.349*
(0.128) (0.113) (0.131) (0.136) (0.131) (0.145)
EQ 0.005 0.006 -0.005 0.008 0.004 0.006
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.014)
RSIZE 1.590* -3.147 2.106* 1.624* 2.797**
(0.686) (2.722) (0.898) (0.676) (0.969)
BIG_t 1.729**
(0.645)
EQ_RSIZE 0.050+
(0.029)
CAR_b 10.909* 7.952+
(4.553) (4.500)
CAR_t 3.178* 5.307*
(1.576) (2.313)
RUNUP 2.491 4.212
(1.733) (2.597)
MKT_BIDS -0.002
(0.014)
MKT_VOL -0.294*
(0.148)
NUMBID -1.808 -2.177 -1.808 -0.038 -1.876 0.395
(1.871) (1.885) (2.106) (2.189) (1.951) (1.930)
TENDER 0.092 0.348 -0.521 0.606 -0.102 0.972
(1.182) (1.169) (1.151) (1.224) (1.196) (1.462)
HORIZONTAL 1.389** 1.340* 1.513** 1.640* 1.461** 1.276+
(0.515) (0.543) (0.558) (0.664) (0.535) (0.663)
WITHDRAWN -0.664 -0.514 -0.472 -0.846 -0.702 -1.476+
(0.648) (0.679) (0.689) (0.789) (0.672) (0.863)
NEW_EQ50 -2.104 -1.841 -2.452 -2.378+ -2.153 -2.722+
(1.484) (1.181) (1.633) (1.365) (1.348) (1.394)
HOSTILE -0.148 -0.500 0.745 -0.277 -0.119 0.992
(1.491) (1.577) (1.594) (1.718) (1.514) (2.200)
pseudo R2 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.39 0.30 0.43
ll -65.267 -64.325 -64.194 -54.701 -64.115 -51.064
aic 200.533 198.650 200.388 183.402 200.231 182.128
bic 301.695 299.812 304.441 289.501 304.283 296.829
N 133 133 133 130 133 130
+ p < 0.10 , * p < 0.05 , ** p < 0.01 , *** p < 0.001
Note: The table reports the second stage of a sequential model, where the sample consists of
negative premiums. [W]-[ZB] report logistic regressions with a dummy (=1) for negative post-
announcement premiums (base price at t=5) as dependent. Models [W]-[Z] test Proposition 6
directly. [ZA][ZB] test Proposition 6 indirectly by analyzing competing explanations. All
models include ﬁxed eﬀects for year, target SIC, and bidder SIC (unreported). Reported
standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity. BIG_t is a dummy for the
upper quintile of RSIZE . EQ_RSIZE is the interaction of EQ and RSIZE . See notes of Table 2
for the deﬁnition of other variables.
54
Table 9: VLPs (lowest decile of all premiums)
[A1] [B1] [E1] [H1] [I1] [J1] [M1]
TQ_t 0.14∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
TQ_b -0.13∗∗∗ -0.08∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗
PRIMV_t 0.01∗
PRIMV_b -0.00
RUNUP 2.71∗∗∗
RUNUPxTQ_t -0.26∗∗
BIG_t 1.09∗∗∗
NEW_EQ 0.02∗∗∗
EQ_RSIZE 0.01∗∗
EQ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.01∗∗∗
RSIZE 0.74∗∗∗ 1.47∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ -0.03 0.83∗∗∗
MKT_BIDS -0.00
MKT_VOL -0.05∗
NUMBID -0.03 -1.35 0.25 -0.05 -0.08 -0.07 0.02
TENDER -0.21 -1.39 -0.48 -0.76∗∗ -0.60∗ -0.25 -0.24
HORIZONTAL -0.03 -0.14 -0.10 -0.08 -0.06 -0.02 -0.01
WITHDRAWN 0.32 0.35 -0.00 0.37 0.45∗ 0.30 0.32
NEW_EQ50 0.41 0.28 0.08 0.71 0.72 0.14 0.44
HOSTILE -0.09 0.19 -0.26 -0.43 -0.16 0.01 -0.16
pseudo R2 0.13 0.23 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.14
ll -505.42 -156.72 -508.92 -508.41 -516.40 -501.70 -497.39
aic 1088.83 385.43 1099.85 1092.82 1108.80 1083.40 1076.79
bic 1302.64 542.13 1324.57 1301.14 1317.12 1302.68 1301.35
N 1776 574 1774 1776 1776 1776 1767
∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: All models refer to logistic regressions with a dummy for VLPs (<p10) as dependent.
The base date for the VLPs in [E1] is t-1 to prevent overlap with runups (t-20 to t-1).
[A1][B1] test Proposition 1 for VLPs and [E1] Proposition 2 for VLPs. [I1][J1] test
Proposition 4 for VLPs and [H1] Proposition 5 for VLPs. Model [M1] tests Proposition 7
for VLPs. All models include ﬁxed eﬀects for year, target SIC, and bidder SIC
(unreported). Standard errors (unreported) are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
RUNUPxTQ_t is the interaction between RUNUP and TQ_t. See notes of Table 2 for the
deﬁnition of other variables.
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Table 11: Robustness checks based on diﬀerent deﬁnition of premiums
[R1] [R2] [R3] [R4] [R5] [R6]
TQ_t 0.134∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.063∗
(0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.030)
TQ_b -0.142∗∗ -0.082∗∗ -0.065∗ -0.065∗ -0.095∗ -0.019
(0.051) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) (0.040) (0.027)
EQ 0.011∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
RSIZE 0.687∗∗∗ 0.659∗∗∗ 0.593∗∗ 0.471∗ 0.672∗∗∗ 0.369
(0.204) (0.181) (0.191) (0.183) (0.190) (0.198)
NUMBID 0.617 0.162 0.282 0.430 -0.057 -0.421
(0.471) (0.456) (0.532) (0.520) (0.544) (0.561)
TENDER -0.274 -0.377 -0.357 -0.405 -0.221 -0.110
(0.411) (0.368) (0.376) (0.332) (0.372) (0.349)
HORIZONTAL 0.052 0.164 0.054 -0.060 -0.085 -0.090
(0.234) (0.196) (0.212) (0.189) (0.224) (0.207)
WITHDRAWN 0.381 0.438 0.163 -0.226 0.055 0.445
(0.286) (0.260) (0.293) (0.301) (0.311) (0.272)
NEW_EQ50 0.325 0.331 0.433 0.356 0.510 -0.060
(0.484) (0.479) (0.471) (0.470) (0.496) (0.563)
HOSTILE -0.571 -0.000 -0.709 -0.945 -0.596 0.985
(1.168) (0.867) (1.129) (1.099) (1.146) (0.603)
pseudo R2 0.14 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.09
ll -321.258 -409.555 -379.704 -456.372 -359.881 -406.304
aic 720.515 897.109 835.409 990.744 795.762 888.608
bic 934.318 1110.912 1041.865 1204.503 1002.174 1096.455
N 1776 1776 1691 1774 1689 1754
∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: [R1]-[R6] report logistic regressions with a various deﬁnitions of negative premiums as
dependent. [R1] refers to negative premiums smaller -5 percent (using the standard measure).
[R2] refers to the standard measure (t=-20) but without stock index adjustment. [R3] refers
to an index adjusted base price at t=-5 and [R4] at t=-1. [R5] refers to the average premium
based on t=-20, t=-5 and t=-1. [R6] refers to an index adjusted base price at t=-40 (8 weeks).
All models include ﬁxed eﬀects for year, target SIC, and bidder SIC (unreported). Reported
standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity. See notes of Table 2 for
the deﬁnition of variables.
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Figure 1: Premiums (median) over time
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Appendix A (Proofs)
Lemma 1
Proof. From (13) follows that the post-merger premium pm is positive whenever
p − e ξ(v
B
f +v
T
f +s)−b
vTf
> 0. Substituting (4) into (10) leads to ξ =
vTf +λs
vBf +v
T
f +λs
.
Substituting ξ, the oﬀer premium p = b
vTf
−1, as well as the bid b = vTf +λs into
(13) leads to the following suﬃcient condition on the hidden earnout pih that
guarantees a positive post-merger premium
pih = e
vTf +λs
vBf +v
T
f +λs
(vBf + v
T
f + s)− (vTf + λs)
vTf
>
∣∣∣∣∣vTf + λsvTf − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
which can be simpliﬁed to
e (λ− 1)
(
vTf + sλ
)
s
−
(
vBf + v
T
f + λs
) > |λs|
Given that all other variables are assumed to have positive values, the oﬀer
premium p = b
vTf
− 1 can only be negative if λ < 0. That is, the bid in the oﬀer
premium contains no merger synergies and is lower than the target's fair value.
In this case, the above inequality simpliﬁes to:
e (λ− 1)
(
vTf + sλ
)
−
(
vBf + v
T
f + λs
) > −λ⇔ e >
(
vBf + v
T
f + λs
)
(
vTf + sλ
) −(−λ)
(λ− 1) .
To ensure negative premiums due to hidden earnouts, the equity portion has
to exceed e∗ deﬁned as e∗ ≡ −λ1−λ
vBf +v
T
f +λs
vTf +λs
. We have to ensure that e∗ ∈ [0, 1];
thus, we derive conditions such that 0 ≤ e∗ ≤ 1. It is obvious that e∗ ≥ 0, as
p < 0⇔ λ < 0, which also implies 1−λ > 0. To ensure that e∗ ≤ 1, the target's
size has to be below the following threshold:
−λ
1− λ
vBf + v
T
f + λs
vTf + λs
≤ 1
⇔ vTf ≤ −λ
(
vBf + s
)
(15)
The acquirer's shareholders gain control of the merged entity if ξ is below
.5. This implies for the target's size:
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vTf + λs
vBf + v
T
f + λs
≤ 1
2
⇔ vTf ≤ vBf − λs (16)
Whether (15) or (16) are binding depends on the value of λ. If λ ∈ [−1, 0)
inequality (15) is binding; hence, if hidden earnouts exist under the conditions
derived (e > e∗ and vTf fulﬁlls inequality (15)), the acquirer does not lose control
over the merged entity. Yet, if λ < −1, inequality (16) ensures that the acquirer
does not lose control. Hence, for suﬃciently low vTf , e > e
∗ and λ < 0, we
observe a positive pm in combination with a negative p.
Proposition 4
The proposition follows directly from the ﬁrst derivatives of (12) with respect
to e and ξ.
Proposition 5
Consider ξ =
vTf +λs
vBf +v
T
f +λs
. If ξ ≤ 12 ⇒ vBf ≥ vTf + λs or 1− λsvBf ≥
vTf
vBf
. Note that if
the acquirer does not want to lose control to the target, only a negative λ allows
him to acquire a larger target, while a positive λ is only feasible for smaller
targets.
At the same time e and λ need to be chosen such that pm ≥ 0. This leads to
the following condition (where the second inequality follows from substituting
vBf = v
T
f + λs, i.e. the lower bound for v
B
f ):
e (λ− 1)
(
vTf + sλ
)
s
−
(
vBf + v
T
f + sλ
) > |λs| =⇒ 2 |λ|
(1− λ) < e.
The graph below shows the threshold (which is a function of λ and represented
by the dotted line) which e needs to exceed in order to guarantee pm ≥ 0.
Obviously, high values of e → 1 are only feasible in combination with λ ∈
[−1, 1/3] .
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Assuming e = 1, substituting these feasible values of λ into 1 − λs
vBf
≥ v
T
f
vBf
shows that if λ = −1 ⇒ 1 + s
vBf
≥ v
T
f
vBf
, and hence the relative target size
vTf
vBf
can be larger than 1, while for λ = 1/3 ⇒ 1 − 13 svBf ≥
vTf
vBf
, the ratio should be
smaller than 1.
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Appendix B (VLPs)
Table 12: VLP (lowest decile) - Overvaluation and runups
[A1] [B1] [C1] [D1] [E1]
TQ_t 0.14∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
TQ_b -0.13∗∗∗ -0.08∗ -0.08∗
PRIMV_t 0.01∗
PRIMV_b -0.00
ACCR_t 0.27
ACCR_b -0.29
NOA_t 0.00
NOA_b -0.09
RUNUP 1.83∗∗∗ 2.71∗∗∗
RUNUPxTQ_t -0.26∗∗
EQ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.01∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
RSIZE 0.74∗∗∗ 1.47∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗
NUMBID -0.03 -1.35 -1.29 0.22 0.25
TENDER -0.21 -1.39 -0.88 -0.44 -0.48
HORIZONTAL -0.03 -0.14 -0.09 -0.12 -0.10
WITHDRAWN 0.32 0.35 0.19 0.01 -0.00
NEW_EQ50 0.41 0.28 0.69 0.08 0.08
HOSTILE -0.09 0.19 -0.17 -0.32 -0.26
pseudo R2 0.13 0.23 0.20 0.11 0.12
ll -505.42 -156.72 -177.01 -512.83 -508.92
aic 1088.83 385.43 430.01 1105.66 1099.85
bic 1302.64 542.13 597.22 1324.90 1324.57
N 1776 574 602 1774 1774
∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: All models refer to logistic regressions with a dummy for VLPs (<p10) as dependent.
The base date for the VLPs in [D1]-[E1] is t-1 to prevent overlap with runups (t-20 to t-1).
[A1]-[C1] test Proposition 1 for VLPs and [D1]-[E1] Proposition 2 for VLPs.
All models include ﬁxed eﬀects for year, target SIC, and bidder SIC (unreported).
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. RUNUPxTQ_t is the interaction
between RUNUP and TQ_t . See notes of Table 2 for the deﬁnition of other variables.
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Table 13: VLP (lowest decile) - Hidden earnouts
[F1] [G1] [H1] [I1] [J1] [K1]
TQ_t 0.14∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗
TQ_b -0.15∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗
EQ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.01
RSIZE 0.77∗∗∗ -0.03 0.60∗
BIG_t 1.09∗∗∗
NEW_EQ 0.02∗∗∗
EQ_RSIZE 0.01∗∗
ROIC -0.00
TURNOVER -0.10
CI -0.01
NUMBID -0.06 0.02 -0.05 -0.08 -0.07 -0.21
TENDER -0.25 -0.86∗∗ -0.76∗∗ -0.60∗ -0.25 -0.31
HORIZONTAL -0.04 -0.02 -0.08 -0.06 -0.02 0.22
WITHDRAWN 0.57∗ 0.33 0.37 0.45∗ 0.30 0.43
NEW_EQ50 1.16∗∗ 0.54 0.71 0.72 0.14 0.30
HOSTILE -0.09 -0.20 -0.43 -0.16 0.01 0.10
pseudo R2 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.10
ll -513.97 -514.19 -508.41 -516.40 -501.70 -302.75
aic 1103.93 1104.37 1092.82 1108.80 1083.40 659.50
bic 1312.25 1312.69 1301.14 1317.12 1302.68 795.00
N 1776 1776 1776 1776 1776 1117
∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: All models refer to logistic regressions with a dummy for VLPs (<p10) as dependent.
[F1][I1][J1] test Proposition 4 for VLPs and [G1]-[H1] Proposition 5 for VLPs.
[K1] explores the role of expected synergies. All models include ﬁxed eﬀects for year,
target SIC, and bidder SIC (unreported). Standard errors are corrected for hetero-
skedasticity. BIG_t is a dummy for the upper quintile of RSIZE . EQ_RSIZE is the inter-
action of EQ and RSIZE . See notes of Table 2 for the
deﬁnition of other variables.
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Table 14: VLP (lowest decile) - Liquidity and agency
[L1] [M1] [N1] [O1] [P1] [Q1]
TQ_t 0.13∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.11
TQ_b -0.14∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗ -0.05
EQ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.01 0.01∗
RSIZE 0.87∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 1.24∗∗∗ 0.98∗
ZERO 1.36
SPREAD 0.06
MKT_BIDS -0.00
MKT_VOL -0.05∗
LEVERAGE -0.25∗ -0.23∗
SHORT_DEBT 0.41
CASH_TA 0.95 1.00
WC_TA -1.04 -1.03
LIAB -0.17 -0.17
NDA_t -1.20 1.16
NDA_b -1.94 2.57
DA_t 0.69 -0.23
DA_b 0.26 0.45
NUMBID -0.34 0.02 0.04 -0.11 -1.32 -0.88
TENDER -0.26 -0.24 -0.20 -0.27 -0.90 -0.63
HORIZONTAL 0.05 -0.01 -0.00 -0.03 -0.17 0.47
WITHDRAWN 0.32 0.32 0.22 0.23 0.26 1.13∗∗
NEW_EQ50 0.07 0.44 0.15 0.13 0.74 -0.65
HOSTILE -0.46 -0.16 -0.07 -0.20 -0.05 0.17
pseudo R2 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.23 0.18
ll -391.16 -497.39 -283.02 -327.18 -170.25 -155.41
aic 864.32 1076.79 654.04 740.37 420.50 392.81
bic 1082.19 1301.35 871.96 958.74 596.51 569.59
N 1501 1767 1046 1186 602 551
∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Models [L1]-[Q1] report logistic regressions with a dummy for VLPs (<p10) as dependent.
The dependent variable in [Q1] is a dummy for positive VLPs (lowest decile). Models [L1]-[P1] test
Proposition 7 for VLPs. [P1][Q1] explore the role of agency costs. All models include ﬁxed
eﬀects for year, target SIC, and bidder SIC (unreported). Standard errors are corrected for
heteroskedasticity. See notes of Table 2 for the deﬁnition of variables.
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